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Nation-State Hackers, Cybercriminals Weaponize Patched WinRAR Flaw Despite Six-Month-Old Fix

29 January 2026 at 05:38

WinRAR, CVE-2025-8088, Nation-State Actors

Russian and Chinese espionage groups continue to exploit an N-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) in WinRAR alongside financially motivated actors, all leveraging a path traversal vulnerability that drops malware into Windows Startup folders.

Google Threat Intelligence Group discovered widespread exploitation of a critical WinRAR vulnerability six months after the vendor patched it, with government-backed hackers from Russia and China deploying the flaw alongside financially motivated cybercriminals. The attacks demonstrate how effective exploits remain valuable long after patches become available, especially when organizations delay updates.

CVE-2025-8088, a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR, allows attackers to write files to arbitrary system locations by crafting malicious RAR archives. RARLAB released WinRAR version 7.13 on July 30, 2025, to address the flaw. However, exploitation began at least 12 days earlier, on July 18, according to ESET research.

Read: New Zero-Day in WinRAR Abused by RomCom

The vulnerability exploits Alternate Data Streams, a Windows feature that allows multiple data streams to be associated with a single file. Attackers conceal malicious files within ADS entries of decoy documents inside archives. While victims view what appears to be a legitimate PDF or document, hidden payload streams execute in the background.

The exploit uses specially crafted paths combining ADS features with directory traversal characters. A file might carry a composite name like "innocuous.pdf:malicious.lnk" paired with a path traversing to critical directories. When victims open the archive, the ADS content extracts to destinations specified by the traversal path, frequently targeting the Windows Startup folder for automatic execution at next login.

Multiple Russian threat groups consistently exploit the vulnerability in campaigns targeting Ukrainian military and government entities using highly tailored geopolitical lures. UNC4895, also known as RomCom, conducts dual financial and espionage operations through spearphishing emails with subject lines indicating targeting of specific Ukrainian military units. The attacks deliver NESTPACKER malware, externally known as Snipbot.

APT44, tracked under the designation FROZENBARENTS, drops decoy files with Ukrainian filenames alongside malicious LNK files attempting further downloads. TEMP.Armageddon, designated CARPATHIAN, uses RAR archives to place HTA files into Startup folders, with the HTA acting as a downloader for second-stage payloads. This activity continued through January 2026.

Turla, adopted CVE-2025-8088 to deliver the STOCKSTAY malware suite using lures themed around Ukrainian military activities and drone operations. A China-nexus actor exploits the vulnerability to deliver POISONIVY malware via BAT files dropped into Startup folders, which then download droppers.

The exploitation mirrors widespread abuse of CVE-2023-38831, a previous WinRAR bug that government-backed actors heavily exploited despite available patches. The pattern demonstrates that exploits for known vulnerabilities remain highly effective when organizations fail to patch promptly.

Financially motivated threat groups quickly adopted the vulnerability. One group targeting Indonesian entities uses lure documents to drop CMD files into Startup folders. These scripts download password-protected RAR archives from Dropbox containing backdoors that communicate with Telegram bot command-and-control servers.

Another group focuses on hospitality and travel sectors, particularly in Latin America, using phishing emails themed around hotel bookings to deliver commodity remote access trojans including XWorm and AsyncRAT. A separate group targeting Brazilian users via banking websites delivered malicious Chrome extensions that inject JavaScript into pages of two Brazilian banking sites to display phishing content and steal credentials.

An actor known as "zeroplayer" advertised a WinRAR exploit in July 2025, shortly before widespread exploitation began. zeroplayer's portfolio extends beyond WinRAR. In November 2025, the actor claimed a sandbox escape remote code execution zero-day exploit for Microsoft Office, advertising it for $300,000. In late September 2025, zeroplayer advertised a remote code execution zero-day for an unnamed popular corporate VPN provider.

Starting mid-October 2025, zeroplayer advertised a Windows local privilege escalation zero-day exploit for $100,000. In early September 2025, the actor advertised a zero-day for an unspecified drive allowing attackers to disable antivirus and endpoint detection and response software for $80,000.

zeroplayer's continued activity demonstrates the commoditization of the attack lifecycle. By providing ready-to-use capabilities, actors like zeroplayer reduce technical complexity and resource demands, allowing groups with diverse motivations—from ransomware deployment to state-sponsored intelligence gathering—to leverage sophisticated capabilities.

The rapid exploitation adoption occurred despite Google Safe Browsing and Gmail actively identifying and blocking files containing the exploit. When reliable proof of concept for critical flaws enters cybercriminal and espionage marketplaces, adoption becomes instantaneous. This blurs lines between sophisticated government-backed operations and financially motivated campaigns.

The vulnerability's commoditization reinforces that effective defense requires immediate application patching coupled with fundamental shifts toward detecting consistent, predictable post-exploitation tactics.

Google published comprehensive indicators of compromise in a VirusTotal collection for registered users to assist security teams in hunting and identifying related activity.

Fake WinRAR downloads hide malware behind a real installer

8 January 2026 at 05:36

A member of our web research team pointed me to a fake WinRAR installer that was linked from various Chinese websites. When these links start to show up, that’s usually a good indicator of a new campaign.

So, I downloaded the file and started an analysis, which turned out to be something of a Matryoshka doll. Layer after layer, after layer.

WinRAR is a popular utility that’s often downloaded from “unofficial” sites, which gives campaigns offering fake downloads a bigger chance of being effective.

Often, these payloads contain self-extracting or multi-stage components that can download further malware, establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or open backdoors, all depending on an initial system analysis. So it was no surprise that one of the first actions this malware took was to access sensitive Windows data in the form of Windows Profiles information.

This, along with other findings from our analysis (see below), indicates that the file selects the “best-fit” malware for the affected system before further compromising or infecting it.

How to stay safe

Mistakes are easily made when you’re looking for software to solve a problem, especially when you want that solution fast. A few simple tips can help keep you safe in situations like this.

  • Only download software from official and trusted sources. Avoid clicking links that promise to deliver that software on social media, in emails, or on other unfamiliar websites.
  • Use a real-time, up-to-date anti-malware solution to block threats before they can run.

Analysis

The original file was called winrar-x64-713scp.zip and the initial analysis with Detect It Easy (DIE) already hinted at several layers.

Detect It Easy first analysis
Detect It Easy first analysis: 7-Zip, UPX, SFX — anything else?

Unzipping the file produced winrar-x64-713scp.exe which turned out to be a UPX packed file that required the --force option to unpack it due to deliberate PE anomalies. UPX normally aborts compression if it finds unexpected values or unknown data in the executable header fields, as that data may be required for the program to run correctly. The --force option tells UPX to ignore these anomalies and proceed with decompression anyway.

Looking at the unpacked file, DIE showed yet another layer: (Heur)Packer: Compressed or packed data[SFX]. Looking at the strings inside the file I noticed two RunProgram instances:

RunProgram="nowait:\"1winrar-x64-713scp1.exe\" "

RunProgram="nowait:\"youhua163

These commands tell the SFX archive to run the embedded programs immediately after extraction, without waiting for it to complete (nowait).

Using PeaZip, I extracted both embedded files.

The Chinese characters “安装” complicated the string analysis, but they translate as “install,” which further piqued my interest. The file 1winrar-x64-713scp1.exe turned out to be the actual WinRAR installer, likely included to ease suspicion for anyone running the malware.

After removing another layer, the other file turned out to be a password-protected zip file named setup.hta. The obfuscation used here led me to switch to dynamic analysis. Running the file on a virtual machine showed that setup.hta is unpacked at runtime directly into memory. The memory dump revealed another interesting string: nimasila360.exe.

This is a known file often created by fake installers and associated with the Winzipper malware. Winzipper is a known Chinese-language malicious program that pretends to be a harmless file archive so it can sneak onto a victim’s computer, often through links or attachments. Once opened and installed, it quietly deploys a hidden backdoor that lets attackers remotely control the machine, steal data, and install additional malware, all while the victim believes they’ve simply installed legitimate software.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Domains:

winrar-tw[.]com

winrar-x64[.]com

winrar-zip[.]com

Filenames:

winrar-x64-713scp.zip

youhua163安装.exe

setup.hta (dropped in C:\Users\{username}\AppData\Local\Temp)

Malwarebytes’ web protection component blocks all domains hosting the malicious file and installer.

Malwarebytes blocks winrar-tw[.]com
Malwarebytes blocks winrar-tw[.]com
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